

THE COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER-FORCE AND THE STABILITY AND  
SUPPORT-FORCE: A DUAL FORCE CONCEPT TO MEET THE  
CHALLENGES OF FUTURE OPERATIONS

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by

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## ABSTRACT

THE COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER-FORCE AND THE STABILITY AND SUPPORT-FORCE: A DUAL FORCE CONCEPT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF FUTURE OPERATIONS, by Major E. Blake Witherell, 113 pages.

In every new conflict, the current force structure and warfighting methodology of the military has been outdated and ill suited to achieve a quick decisive victory. Simply put, the military has always been caught “flat footed.” The past ten years of war has been a continuous struggle for the American military, which has been forced to adapt and change throughout the conflict. With the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and approaching culmination of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S Army must reflect upon a decade of warfare and critical lessons learned to shape the force for conflicts in an uncertain future; one in which a full spectrum of capabilities will be required.

As a Major in the U.S. Army, it falls upon my shoulders to adequately train our forces to meet the needs of our nation and be ready for a holistic approach to Unified Land Operations as outlined in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0. This is a difficult task that is further complicated by the level of training required to properly conduct full spectrum operations. As any good coach would say, playing “Iron-Man” football is not the preferred method. In other words, when you have to be good at playing all positions, the quality of play decreases. Therefore, it is important to look at how we can restructure the Army to allow our forces to concentrate their efforts on different aspects of warfare and, as a team, bring Unified Land Operations to fruition.

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## ACRONYMS

ABCT	Armor Brigade Combat Team
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AOC	Army Operational Concept
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDE	Brigade
CA	Civil Affairs
CAM	Combined Arms Maneuver
CAM-F	Combined Arms Maneuver-Force
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMETL	Core Mission Essential Task List
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CTC	Combat Training Center
DA	Department of the Army
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEF	Deployment Expeditionary Force
DHS	Department of Homeland Security



DMETL	Directed Mission Essential Task List
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities
EUCOM	European Command
FM	Field Manual
GCC	Geographical Combatant Commander
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IR	Islamic Resistance
JTF	Joint Task Force
MCO	Major Combat Operations
MET	Mission Essential Task
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MP	Military Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
OEF	Operations Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operations Iraqi Freedom

OOTW	Operations Other Than War
PACOM	Pacific Command
RAB	Regionally-Aligned Brigade
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration
S&S-F	Stability and Support-Force
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SysAdmin	System Administrators
T.O.C.	Transnational Organized Crime
TOW	Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided missile
U.S.	United States
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
WAS	Wide Area Security
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### The Need for Reflection

A Nation that does not prepare for all forms of war should renounce the use of war in national policy. A people that does not prepare to fight should then be morally prepared for surrender. To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited, bloody ground actions and then engage in it, is folly verging on the criminal.

— T.R. Fehrenbach, 1963

Throughout its history, America's military properly manned, trained, and equipped its forces for war. However, these preparations have always been a reflection of the force needed for the previous war or conflict. In every new conflict, the current force structure and war fighting methodology was outdated and ill suited to achieve a quick and decisive victory. Simply put, the military is caught "flat footed." This trend is further exacerbated by the complex contemporary global environment of the 21st century. The past ten years of war is marked by a continuous struggle for the American military, which was forced to adapt and change throughout the conflict. With the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and approaching culmination of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the United States (U.S.) military must reflect upon a decade of warfare and critical lessons learned to shape the Army for future conflicts, for which a full spectrum of capabilities are required.

Today, as the military's senior leadership analyzes lessons from the war in Iraq and Afghanistan in an attempt to shape the "way ahead" for the Army, two fundamental (yet opposing) concepts have emerged as possible considerations. The first centers on the view that the U.S. military should at all cost avoid committing itself to fighting a

counterinsurgency (COIN), and focus on regaining a high level of proficiency in defeating well-trained and equipped conventional forces. The second supports a holistic approach in which Army forces are capable of conducting conventional and irregular warfare simultaneously.

### The Need to Refocus on Conventional Warfare

An analysis of Task Force Smith demonstrates the importance of maintaining a combat ready force proficient in planning and executing high intensity combat operations. Task Force Smith at the battle of Osan was the first U.S. Army ground maneuver unit to enter combat in Korea and is a classic illustration of unpreparedness. The battle took place on 5 July 1950, and since then, it was examined and written about by several military experts. The battle widely understood as one of the most famous examples of a U.S. force defeated in combat (Barnett 1999). General of the Army MacArthur's strategy in response to the North Korean invasion was to prevent the enemy from capturing Pusan, the most critical port in Korea. The sheer presence of U.S forces was designed to interdict the enemy from advancing toward the ports. However, MacArthur could deploy his forces from Japan to defeat the enemy on the Korean peninsula if needed. To effectively accomplish this, MacArthur required rapidly deployable forces that were able to respond appropriately to counter North Korean's attack. However, following World War II, President Truman's Administration was compelled to "bring the boys home" and redirect the defense budget to solve domestic problems (Davies 1992, 10-12). Constrained defense budgets, as well as a commitment to reduce the active duty force, led to poor training practices, ill equipped units, and a lack of disciplined soldiers.

When the Eighth Army, under MacArthur's orders, directed the rapid deployment of a force to Pusan in order to interdict North Korea's movement, they were only capable of mobilizing a battalion with limited weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Thus, Task Force Smith, named for its commander, deployed with 406 men of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, as well as 134 men of A Battery, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion. Both units were under strength, ill equipped, and conducted very little force on force training. Additionally, the deployment of American forces along the Pongt'aek-Ansong line was solely arranged so that Task Force Smith could fight as far forward as possible. The terrain selected was not a viable defensive position, nor was it considered key terrain. The area prevented the forces from protecting their lines of communications. The individual platoon's objectives were not nested with the Task Force's higher objective or plans. Therefore, this unprepared relatively light infantry force was no match for the formidable 107th Tank Regiment, North Korean 105th Armored Division and its 33 Soviet made T-34 tanks. The idea that Task Force Smith would be able to interdict an armored force was a strategic mistake that revealed an unpreparedness of the unit to conduct conventional combat operations. Within three hours the Task Force was forced to withdraw. This not only demonstrates the need for Army units to be properly manned, trained, and equipped, but also a need to understand the fundamentals of conventional warfare (Garrett 2000, 33-40).

Task Force Smith faced several problems that the current U.S. Army is facing today. The drawdown of military forces, budget constraints, and realignment of priorities and missions are just a few similarities between the Army of 1950 and 2012. However, in more recent history, the U.S. Army has quickly achieved decisive victory over its

conventional enemies. Operation Desert Storm clearly demonstrated the U.S. military's ability to effectively defeat a conventional force. It therefore may seem logical to focus on irregular warfare and COIN where, during OIF and OEF, the Army struggled to achieve operational success. This same ideological process was accepted by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), which devastatingly proved false in the 2005 to 2006 Lebanon War.

Since its establishment as a state, Israel's geopolitical circumstance requires a national defense policy that can adapt to an ever-changing threat environment. Traditionally, the IDF relied upon capabilities that would decisively defeat a conventional force. However, the Palestinian uprising and terrorist attacks inside Israel changed the IDF focus to irregular warfare. To counter the Palestinian threat, the IDF adapted a low intensity doctrinal and training methodology, relying primarily on precision targeting strikes. The IDF believed its superior airpower, as well as its past dominant victories against its adversaries, were enough to deter any conventional enemy. Thus, while training for irregular warfare, the IDF failed to maintain skills critical to fight aspects of a conventional war (Cohen 2008, 164-174).

Hezbollah, a non-state actor operating in Lebanon, emerged with the capability to conduct a hybrid war of irregular and conventional tactics against Israel through its military arm, the Islamic Resistance (IR). This hybrid style of warfare was made up of several methods. This includes establishing a system for firing Katyusha rockets into Israel, conducting complex ambushes, and blending its forces within the population to remain undetected by the IDF. The purpose of the offensive rocket campaign was to psychologically damage Israel's population. Simultaneously, the IR prepared defensive

positions in Lebanon to repel a counter attack from the IDF. IR forces assigned to construct these defensive positions, as well as protect the rockets, were armed and equipped with an array of sophisticated weaponry. This included the AT-14 Kornet-E to the American made Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire command, (also known as TOW) guided antitank missiles. When a target of opportunity emerged, IR forces intermixed within the population and acted as observers to direct the rocket attack against key military and civilian Israeli targets within Israel. When the IR attack began on 12 July 2006, the IDF's first response was an air campaign to cut off the IR's supply lines and destroy their missile launch sites. However, the IR's supplies were already prepositioned within their defensive and missile firing positions, which had created a front line of forces that were self-sufficient. These positions were strategically placed within populated areas, making it difficult for the Israeli Air Force to identify legitimate military targets and avoid civilian casualties (Cordesman 2006, 10-12).

As a result of the offensive rocket campaign, the IDF committed ground forces in order to defeat the IR. These forces entered Lebanon via Maroun Al-Ras on 17 July and were completely surprised by the complexity and level of resistance by the IR operations. It took six days of intensive close quarter combat maneuvers for the IDF to secure the town of Maroun Al-Ras, which ultimately provided little strategic advantage. As the war continued, the IDF gained little ground and no significant tactical advantage as they attempted to advance toward known IR positions. Their armored forces could not maneuver within the city and their light forces were unable to gain a tactical advantage over the IR forces. The IR's tactical methods of utilizing Improvised Explosive Devices (also known as IED), anti-tank ambushes, and exploitation of the city to mask their



movement, proved extremely effective against Israel's conventional forces. On 16 August, the IDF withdrew its forces from Lebanon, suffering 117 casualties—the most Israel had experienced since 1987. The IR strategy proved successfully and led to the defeat of the IDF in the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006 (Johnson 2011, 4-7).

Most military experts conclude that Israel's initial view of Hezbollah, as a terrorist organization incapable of training, developing, and organizing its forces for conventional warfare, ultimately led to their defeat. Additionally, Israel's approach toward the Palestinian threat focused their military on conducting mostly urban COIN tactics. This approach left Israel unprepared for conventional urban combat within Lebanon. One can clearly see the parallel between the 2006 IDF and the current U.S. Army in terms of shifting its focus to COIN. Since 2001, the U.S. Army primarily conducted irregular warfare in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, the U.S. Army focused on conducting COIN operations. Post conflict, the IDF concluded that it must prepare for future conflicts, with a balanced approach between low intensity and high intensity warfare. They believe this approach provides the greatest flexibility to prepare toward an uncertain future (Johnson 2011, ii).

### Understanding Irregular Warfare

Top U.S. Army officials are now examining the same methodology of conducting both conventional and irregular warfare adopted by the IDF. As demonstrated by Task Force Smith in 1950 and by the IDF in 2006, conventional warfare is a perishable skill and must be mastered by ones' military force. In the same regard, OEF and OIF have clearly demonstrated a need for conventional forces to conduct irregular warfare—including counterinsurgency. It is evident that when an opposing force is faced with

overwhelming military power, they will rely upon irregular warfare techniques to enhance their opportunity of success. In other words, when conventional warfare is no longer a feasible option, implementation of irregular warfare can enhance military power in order to defeat your opponent. Therefore, since the U.S. Army will always strive to be the world's most powerful land force, it is only logical to also prepare to conduct irregular warfare.

The complexity of irregular warfare goes far beyond one's ability to conduct force-on-force engagements with combatants. Often, the true complexity of a conflict occurs once the enemy forces have been defeated, or at the very least, neutralized. The Department of Defense (DoD) Irregular Warfare-Joint Operating Concept states the following:

What makes irregular warfare—irregular is the focus of its operations—a relevant population—and its strategic purpose—to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the population as its—focus of operations requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary militarily. (Department of Defense 2007)

A more updated publication, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, states irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the population. As such, irregular warfare develops as one or a combination of several possible forms including insurgency, terrorism, and-or organized criminal activity (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b, ix).

Therefore, irregular warfare can be defined as a product of the environment and not simply a type of operation. Based on this definition, the focus of irregular warfare becomes far more complex than exclusively dealing with a belligerent adversary. Instead, military power must also focus on stability operations and enabling civil authority within

the operational environment. The environment becomes the focus of irregular warfare instead of an opposing military force.

This requires a comprehensive understanding of the environment. Local and state governance, economic structure, infrastructure needs, and cultural understanding are examples of some of the critical aspects that must be understood in order to conduct population-centric operations that are required to achieve U.S. objectives and avoid strategic setbacks. Furthermore, these stability operations require an ability to focus all elements of national power towards a common strategic end state (Schaner 2008, 6-7). Military forces must have a comprehensive understanding of interagency coordination, as well as the ability to effectively utilize Inter-Governmental Organization (IGOs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGO) operating in the environment. As demonstrated by both OEF and OIF, stability operations and enabling civil authority can be an extremely complex endeavor.

### The Current Way Ahead and the Problem

The Secretary of Defense outlined what he believes the Joint Force of 2020 must accomplish in his strategic guidance entitled *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century*, by stating “given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of mission” (Department of Defense 2012, 6). Additionally, in the recently published *Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey states, “the Joint Force of 2020 must be agile, adaptive, and capable of answering our Nation’s call—anytime, anywhere” (Dempsey 2012, 2). This current situation leaves most

military experts pondering over the priorities of the Joint Force of 2020. Most conclude, much like the IDF, that the U.S. Army should adopt a balanced approach between low intensity and high intensity warfare in order to face the challenges of contemporary and future enemy threats. However, several military experts contemplate whether or not it is feasible to train and equip a force capable of adequately accomplishing all tasks outlined in Unified Land Operations. Herein lies the problem for the future Joint Force of 2020: if the current structure prevented the Army from meeting these challenges, would it then be necessary to create two separate components in the Army? Does the U.S. Army need to develop a separate Combined Arms Maneuver Force and a Stability and Support Force to meet the challenges of future operations? The Combined Arms Maneuver-Force (CAM-F) would be trained, manned, and equipped to decisively defeat an opposing army in both conventional and irregular warfare. It would be a force designed to overwhelm any military adversary, seize and hold terrain, and win in all out war. The Stability and Support-Force (S&S-F) would provide expertise in governance, economic development, stability operations, and interagency coordination needed to prevent or end a conflict. This research paper will answer the question: does the U.S. Army need to develop a separate CAM-F and an S&S-F to meet the challenges of future operations?

### Common Definitions

It is essential to establish a common definition of key terms in order to understand the context of this research:

Combined Arms Maneuver-Force: A component of the Army capable of defeating enemy forces in high and low intensity conflicts. The Force expertly performs tasks involving combat troops, multiple weapon systems, integration of war fighting functions,

and joint assets. This component of the Army is designed to overwhelm national opponents (i.e., other militaries), seize and hold terrain, and win in all out war. During conventional warfare, the force masses combat power to decisively defeat an opposing army. During irregular warfare, the force conducts focused combat operations to defeat legitimate enemy combatants.

Conventional Warfare: Warfare conducted by using conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states military forces in open confrontation. The forces on each side are well-defined, and fight using weapons that primarily target the opposing army.

High intensity conflict: Conflict between two or more nations and their respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons); command, control and communications; and service support.

Hybrid Threat: The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.

Insurgency: Armed rebellion against a constituted authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. An Insurgency is a type of irregular warfare.

Irregular Warfare: Warfare in which one or more combatants are irregular military rather than regular forces. Guerrilla warfare and asymmetrical warfare are forms of irregular warfare.

Low intensity conflict: A political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.

Stability and Support-Force: A component of the Army capable of conducting pre- and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. The force provides expertise in governance, economic development, stability operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and interagency coordination necessary to prevent, deter, or end conflicts.

Unconventional Warfare: Warfare conducted in an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.

### Conclusion

The data and analysis present in this research will conclude whether or not the U.S. Army is in need of a separate CAM-F and S&S-F in order to meet the challenges of future operations. If the analysis shows support for this new structure, a recommendation for future research will be presented in order to further develop this concept. If the initial analysis is not supportive of the separate CAM-F and S&S-F, an analysis will be conducted to identify operational gaps in the current force structure with recommended solutions. Chapter 2 is a review of the relevant literature pertaining to this research. It addresses the Army's core competencies, the ability to succeed in conventional and irregular war, and arguments that support a two-force model.

## CHAPTER 2

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

#### Other Research

In every new conflict, the current force structure and war fighting methodology has been outdated and ill suited to achieve a decisive victory. With the conclusion of OIF and the anticipated culmination of OEF in 2014, the U.S military must reflect upon critical lessons learned to shape the Army for future conflicts. Several military experts debate whether the current force structure is capable of training and equipping the force to accomplish all tasks outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. Therefore, this research will determine if the development of a separate CAM-F and S&S-F will enhance the U.S. Army's ability to meet the challenges of future operations.

#### The Army's Core Competences

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept*, released in August 2010 describes how the Army of 2016 to 2028 will conduct operations as part of the joint force. This document states that the challenges of future armed conflict make it imperative for the Army to produce a force that is operationally adaptable in a complex environment. This Army must also be capable of performing multiple tasks simultaneously. The premise of this document, which is implemented into Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, is that the Army must be able to conduct decisive action that encompass offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Depending on the conflict, the operations may require a high degree of emphasis on offensive operations, while still conducting

some defensive and stability tasks. At some point during the conflict, a transition will occur when stability operations become the dominating effort with a balanced proportion of offensive and defensive operations.

This Army framework falls in line with the joint operational process, as outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*. Under joint doctrine, each operation has five phases: Phase I (Deter), Phase II (Seize the Initiative), Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize), and finally Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). This does not include Phase 0 (Shape), which occurs before and after the operation has commenced. It is clear that during Phase III (Dominate), the Army would place an emphasis on either offensive or defensive operations in order to overwhelm an enemy force. For example, the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a Phase III operation, in which the ground forces objective was to gain control of Baghdad and defeat the Iraqi Army through offensive means. Later in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the emphasis changed to stability operations, which is Phase IV (Stabilize), under joint doctrine.

To be effective in all phases, the Army has decided to focus on two core competencies, Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS), as outlined in Army Doctrine Publication 3-0. CAM is the application of combat power to defeat enemy ground forces. Through CAM, Army forces leverage decisive combat power against an enemy to seize the initiative, setting and dictating the terms of action while degrading the enemy's ability to mount a coherent response (Caslen and Leonard 2011, 26). CAM operations primary goals are to seize, occupy, and defend land areas and to achieve physical and psychological advantages over the enemy (Department of the Army 2011a, 6).



The Army defines WAS as the application of combat power to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and friendly activities. Its primary purpose is to deny the enemy positions of advantage and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative (Department of the Army 2011a, 6). Army forces conduct WAS to provide the Joint Force Commander with reaction time and maneuver space. Additionally, these forces are able to conduct operations to defeat or isolate the enemy before the enemy regains momentum. WAS supports the ability of army forces to partner with indigenous security forces in order to build their capacity to protect and secure populations. WAS also supports interagency efforts to build partner capacity by developing and strengthening governance, the economy, the rule of law, and other legitimate institutions (Caslen and Leonard 2011, 26). In short, CAM focuses on force on force engagements (whether conventional or irregular), while WAS focuses on the complexity of the operational environment. These two core competencies are the foundation of Unified Land Operations. Unified Land Operations has now replaced the previous Army terminology of full-spectrum operations.

Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis authored an article entitled “The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” in 2005. This article examines the approach and methodology of Task Force Baghdad in implementing full-spectrum COIN operations in Iraq. The Iraqi population was divided into three categories to help define the task force battlespace: anti-Iraqi forces, supporters, and fence sitters. The task force functioned along interconnected Lines of Operations to achieve the operational goals. Execution of traditionally focused combat operations promoted the growth of insurgent forces challenging campaign objectives. Instead they focused on five

Lines of Operations: (1) combat operations, (2) training and employing local security forces, (3) restoring or improving essential services, (4) promoting governance, and (5) economic pluralism.

Some may question why a military force is concerned with infrastructure repair, governance, and economic pluralism; why not rely on the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and NGOs? Chiarelli and Michaelis believe it comes down to a simple answer of capacity relative to the situation. The U.S. military is built to create secure conditions, which provide the time and space needed to conduct Lines of Operations. True long-term security does not come from the end of a gun but rather, as Chiarelli and Michaelis describe, from a balanced application of all five Lines of Operations within a robust Information Operations campaign. They concluded that the Army must have a force capable of conducting operations which are now synonymous with the Army core competencies, CAM and WAS.

#### The Effect on the Force

The idea of the U.S. Army conducting stability operations, nation building, or any other types of operations other than traditional conflict is not new. Throughout history, U.S. Army units have been utilized effectively for purposes outside of traditional war operations. However, training units to conduct these types of operations has an effect on combat readiness. In November 1998, Bradley K. Nelson, a retired Army colonel and graduate of the U.S Army School of Advanced Military Studies, wrote a monograph examining readiness of the “U.S. Army in Operations Other Than War.” Nelson describes how the decline of the Soviet Union has shifted the focus of the U.S. Army to a multitude of complex operations that are different in nature from those of traditional

warfare. He argues that while there is still a requirement to train for full-scale and high intensity war, the Army had the additional mission of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). His monograph examines the effects of OOTW missions on the readiness of U.S. Army forces. Conclusions from Nelson's research indicate that the U.S. Army's combat readiness is adversely affected by the increased requirement of OOTW missions. Nelson's monograph proposes several recommendations to lessen the degrading effects of OOTW missions on the readiness of U.S. Army active forces. Of particular interest to this research paper are Nelson's views on the need for an amended force structure to support capabilities needed for OOTW mission and training requirements. This supports the theory that additional requirements and forces are needed to properly conduct stability operations (Nelson 1996).

#### Argument in Support of Two Forces

The identified need for proficiency in CAM and WAS, coupled with the concern over force readiness, led several military experts to believe that two separate forces within the U.S. Army are necessary. Each force would focus exclusively on preparing for either force on force conflict or stability operations. In the 2009 *Military Strategy* article entitled "The Future of War and American Military Strategy," Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon present the need for separate organizations that are equally good at performing missions within their respective environments. A synopsis of this argument is included below:

Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United

States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term. (Horowitz and Shalmon 2009, 302)

Predicting future conflict environment is difficult, as Horowitz and Shalmon describe, but it is necessary to shape the future force. As their article states, there are two primary schools of thought, the COIN community, and the traditionalists. The majority of the COIN community believes that the future threat to American forces will be an insurgency. However, traditionalists believe irregular warfare will occur more frequently than traditional warfare. They argue that it is in the best interest of America's security to maintain a traditional military force with the capability to dominate over any adversary military. Horowitz and Shalmon point out that despite their disagreements there are three common linked assumptions between the two sides. First, both believe that future wars will more than likely be a type of irregular warfare, provided the U.S. maintains its economic and military superiority over other world actors. Second, both agree that the U.S. currently has an enormous advantage in conventional military capabilities. Third, while there is disagreement regarding how, or if, the military should transform its force structure, both agree that the force structure must be changed in order to properly conduct COIN warfare. Both also agree that designing a COIN centric force would be expensive and complex (Horowitz and Shalmon 2009, 306).

Horowitz and Shalmon point out that irregular warfare may be the most likely threat, but the loss of conventional military superiority would be detrimental to U.S. security. Specifically, if the U.S. is unable to defeat or deter other state actors with its military power, then the U.S. could lose its global influence. This would degrade the U.S.'s ability, or even desire, to intervene in a small war conflict to win hearts and minds

or destroy a terrorist organization. Horowitz and Shalmon also argue that irregular warfare is the most likely threat only because it is the only logical method an opposing force can use when facing the current military power of the U.S. If the U.S. military becomes a completely COIN centric organization, then it would only be logical for an opposing force to concentrate its military efforts on traditional warfare in order to dominate the land, sea, and air. Horowitz and Shalmon also state that the differences between irregular and conventional warfare may not be as distinct as black and white. During most conflicts there are elements of both types of warfare that intertwine and emerge throughout the operational environment. For example, the Vietnam War, which is often viewed as a misled COIN war, included a traditional phase against the North Vietnam regular army, while the Viet Cong conducted irregular warfare. Horowitz and Shalmon conclude that a hybrid enemy threat must be considered while designing the future force (Horowitz and Shalmon 2009, 312).

Horowitz and Shalmon also conclude that the U.S. must be ready for the most likely enemy threat but maintain its superiority in conventional capabilities. The U.S. military must look at the possibility to have parts of the Army optimized for either COIN or conventional warfare. This will ensure that America's armed forces are properly prepared for confronting a traditional military force, while also trained to deal with the complexity of the COIN environment. This will ensure the U.S. maintains its edge as the leading global military power for the long term (Horowitz and Shalmon 2009, 318).

Horowitz and Shalmon are not the only military strategists who believe that a force structure with units tailored for specific requirements is the best design for an uncertain future. Thomas P. M. Barnett, an American military geostrategist and currently

the chief analyst at Wikistrat (a geostrategic analysis firm), shares a similar view with Horowitz and Shalmon. From October 2001 to June 2003, Barnett worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense. During this time, he developed a strategic concept for the U.S. military, later published in his book *The Pentagon's New Map*. In this book, Barnett presents a concept to guide the U.S. in what is likely to be a long and drawn out War on Terrorism. He provides “a new ordering principle for U.S. national security.” Specifically, Barnett believes the U.S. has to dedicate military resources for the “small war” engagements that will typify the War on Terrorism. These small war engagements are the essence of the War on Terror, and cannot be dealt with as an afterthought (Barnett 2004a).

The concept is further defined in his book *Blueprint for Action*. Barnett distinguishes between two kinds of U.S. military forces—the Leviathan and the System Administrators (SysAdmin). He argues the Leviathan force can produce victory in major military conflicts rapidly, and with casualty levels that are minuscule by any historical standard. The model is based on the force utilized during the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. The SysAdmin force, he argues, needs more work. It does what conservatives used to refer to derisively as nation-building. Barnett believes that the U.S. has employed too few SysAdmin troops in Iraq, creating space for the insurgency to grow and prolonging the counter-insurgency efforts (Barnett 2005).

Throughout his publications, Barnett focuses on the notion that the U.S. military should be employed as an instrument to stabilize unstable regions. The focus of this research paper is not to prove or disprove this notion. However, a review of Barnett’s work provides reasons for the need of a separate Leviathan and SysAdmin force. Barnett

believes the Leviathan force is an instrument to win major high-intensity conflicts. The SysAdmin force is a means to conduct post major conflicts operations, such as developing governance or restoring economic stability. Barnett's conclusions show a need for having two distinct roles for the U.S. Army, with two separate forces, one for combat, and the other for stability operations.

### Using the Current Force Structure for Both Combat and Stability Operations

On June 29, 2010, Lieutenant General (Retired) James Dubik addressed the students and faculty of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The topic of his presentation was preparing the Army for conflicts in an uncertain environment. The talk addressed the challenges of designing that force. One argument he proposed was splitting the forces into two formations, a traditional combat force and a COIN force. A second option was a common force structure with broader capabilities to deal with a full range of potential future threats (Dubik 2010). This inspired Major Thomas R. Miers, a class of 2011 School of Advanced Military Studies student, to write a monograph to address how the Army should optimize its Brigade Combat Team (BCT) for versatility and agility to meet the requirement of 2028 (Miers 2011). In order to answer this question, Miers first identifies the army requirements by looking at the *Army Operational Concept (AOC)* of 2010 and the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)* of 2008. Both of these documents describe the Army as a force capable of conducting a multitude of various operations. These operations range from stability and peace, to insurgency and general war. Miers concluded that the *NDS* requirements support the need for proficiency in CAM and WAS as outlined in the *AOC*. However, the

*NDS* specifies that the most likely level of conflict anticipated is an insurgency (Department of Defense 2008, 15). Additionally, the *NDS* and the *AOC* designate conventional warfare as the most dangerous level of conflict (Department of the Army 2010b, 10). Based on these documents, Mires concludes that a hybrid enemy threat is the best template to design future BCTs. The hybrid enemy, as described by Mires, is when a weaker actor employs several levels of violence as a means to challenge the stronger military force.

Additionally, Mires addresses the current force structure and their operational capabilities and shortfalls. He focuses on the three types of army BCTs—Heavy, Light, and Stryker, and their advantages and disadvantages to various types of warfare. Today Heavy BCTs are referred to as Armor Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), and Light BCTs are referred to as Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). Mires' studies conclude that, although ABCTs are better suited for conventional war and Infantry IBCTs are better prepared for counterinsurgencies, the combined capabilities of current BCTs meet many of the requirements needed for Unified Land Operations. However, combinations of all requirements do not exist in any single BCT. Therefore, in order to prepare a BCT for Unified Land Operations, additional personnel, equipment, and training will be required to close the operational gaps. Mires believes this can be accomplished through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and by ensuring that units have sufficient time to train for their specific mission. However, in order to maintain an army that is rapidly able to conduct both types of operations, Mires concludes that the Department of the Army should redesign all BCTs with two-force structures, one tailored for CAM, the other for WAS.



In essence, what Mires concludes, is to create a hybrid force in which certain units would be tailored more for CAM or WAS. He alludes to the idea of ABCTs being the correct force structure for CAM, while IBCTs would be utilized for WAS. Both would require augmentation to support the other type of warfare. However, Mires research has two main flaws. First, he fails to see the value of having all types of BCTs capable of conducting conventional warfare. For example, an ABCT is arguably the most lethal type of BCT in an open desert environment. However, placed in the jungle, the IBCT would be able to produce more effective fire upon an enemy force than the ABCT. Second, Mires only evaluates the enemy threat as a belligerent force in either traditional warfare or COIN. He fails to evaluate the force's ability to conduct stability operations, for which an entirely different skill set is required.

### Summary

There are strong arguments to support the military experts who are concerned about the shift toward COIN, and would rather see a focus on traditional warfare. There are also strong arguments to support those who believe that the Army should focus on the most likely enemy threat of irregular warfare. A growing community believes that a hybrid enemy force, able to conduct both conventional and irregular warfare, should be the focus of U.S military preparation. However, as demonstrated, the need to conduct a multitude of various operations is widely supported. The design the Army needs to execute these missions remains a contentious debate. Should the Army optimize the BCT to conduct both types of warfare by creating a hybrid military force? Or, does the complexity of both types of warfare require the creation of two separate operational

components? Does the U.S. Army need to develop a separate CAM-F and S&S-F to meet the challenges of future operations?

This chapter reviewed the relevant literature pertaining to this research on the Army's core competencies, the ability to succeed in conventional and irregular war, and arguments that support a two-force model. Chapter 3 explains a three step approach to determine if the development of a separate CAM-F and S&S-F will enhance the Army's ability to meet the challenges of future operations.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHOD

#### What is expected of the U.S. Army?

Success in the future security environment requires Army forces capable of defeating enemies and establishing conditions necessary to achieve national objectives using Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative as part of full spectrum operations (now known as Unified Land Operations). (Caslen and Leonard 2011)

— General Martin E. Dempsey

The *Army Operational Concept* (AOC) of 2016 to 2028 outlines what General Dempsey believes are the conceptual and operating focus of the Army. The AOC describes the employment of forces to conduct full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. General Dempsey describes how the challenges of future-armed conflict make it imperative for the Army to produce leaders and forces that exhibit a high degree of operational adaptability. Achieving the necessary level of operational adaptability requires the Army to build upon a foundation of two broad competencies within the framework of Unified Land Operations: CAM to gain physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over enemy organizations and WAS to consolidate gains, stabilize environments, and ensure freedom of movement and action.

With the Chairman's operations focus in mind, this research will answer the following question: does the U.S. Army need to develop a separate CAM-F and S&S-F to meet the challenges of future operations? The analysis in support of CAM-F and S&S-F will address the roles of both forces and how they argument or directly support each other from Phase 0 to Phase V of an operation as outlined by Joint Publication 5-0 (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Joint Notional Operational Plan Phases

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2011), III-39.

To accomplish this task, this research paper will first identify the potential enemy threat that the Army of 2020 will face. This entails examining the threat design based on the most likely and most dangerous enemy threats to national security, as well as understanding the enemies' operational environment. Additional to the threat design, this research will identify Army capabilities required by the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) to adequately meet their operational challenges. This analysis will generate a list of operations, tasks, and capabilities that the Army will be required to perform.

Next, this research paper will utilize the newly generated list of operations, tasks, and capabilities to compare it to the current force. A descriptive study will be conducted on the current Army force capabilities at the BCT level. This will be accomplished by

examining their Mission Essential Task List (METL) to identify the tasks units are actually prepared for. Tasks and capabilities identified on the operations, tasks, and capabilities list that are not addressed in any unit METL, or are inadequately trained on, will be labeled as an operational or requirement gap.

Following this analysis, this research paper examines eliminating or reducing these operational and requirement gaps by introducing the concept of establishing a separate CAM-F and S&S-F to meet the challenges of future operations. The CAM-F would be trained, manned, and equipped to decisively defeat an opposing army in both conventional and irregular warfare. The S&S-F would provide expertise in governance, economic development, stability operations, and interagency coordination needed to end a conflict. These forces, and their collective ability to perform all the requirements as outlined by the generated list of operations, tasks, and capabilities, will be compared to the current forces structure, to include the Army's operational concept of regionally aligned BCTs.

A common criteria list will be established to compare the notion of a CAM-F and S&S-F against the current forces structure and their abilities to meet these requirements. According to ADRP 3-0, the tenets of Unified Land Operations describe the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and major operations. The tenets of Flexibility, Integration, Lethality, Adaptability, Depth, and Synchronization, as outlined by ADRP 3-0, will be the standard criteria to compare these forces. Evaluating these forces in terms of their ability to accomplish essential tasks and perform critical capabilities, as well as comparing them to the established criteria, will

lead to a conclusion that either supports or rejects the establishment of two separate forces.

In summary, this research paper will conclude whether or not the U.S. Army requires a separate CAM-F and S&S-F by following three steps. Step one—identify the enemy threat and U.S. national needs. Step two—generate and all-inclusive operations, tasks, and capabilities list. Step three—compare the notion of a CAM-F and S&S-F against the current forces structure and their abilities to meet these requirements. If the research conducted supports the establishment of a CAM-F and S&S-F, future research necessary to further develop this concept will be identified. If the research does not support this concept, an analysis will be conducted to identify operational gaps in the current force structure with recommended solutions. It is important to understand that it is not within the scope of this research to examine economic considerations, facilities, and equipment requirements. Further research on these topics will be required in order to fully understand the effects of transforming the Army as proposed. Following the three step process, the next chapter presents the data and analysis needed to determine if the development of a separate CAM-F and S&S-F will enhance the Army's ability to meet the challenges of future operations.

## CHAPTER 4

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### Components of the Solution

We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate regular and irregular warfare, terrorism and criminality. We also face cyber-threats to an increasingly critical and vulnerable information technology infrastructure and the destabilizing effect of global economic downturns. Together, these trends create a complex and unpredictable environment in all of the Army's operational domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.

— 2012 Army Posture Statement

The current structure of the Army is based on Unified Land Operations. This describes how land forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. Unified Land Operations is a single force model in which land forces are capable and proficient in conducting decisive action, the Army core competencies, and mission command. Decisive action is the concept of continuous and simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability, or defensive support of civil authorities, operations (Department of the Army 2012a, 4-11). The Army core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security—are the means for balancing combat power with tactical actions and tasks associated with conducting decisive action. Mission command is both a philosophy of command and a warfighting function. The mission command philosophy refers to the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. The mission command warfighting function develops and integrates activities, thereby enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control (Department of the Army 2011a, 5).

The intent of Unified Land Operations is to develop forces that can obtain victory against any threat or enemy capability. This requires a force that can accomplish a myriad of operations, in multiple environments, against multiple threats. However, this thesis is asking if it is effective to train and equip a force to perform all tasks outlined in Unified Land Operations. Or, would a two-force concept, consisting of a CAM-F and S&S-F be more efficient and effective in contemporary and future operating environments?

### Enemy Threats and their Operational Environment

To determine if changes in U.S. Army force structure are necessary in order to meet the challenges of future operations, it becomes imperative to fully understand what those challenges are and what type of threat the Army will face. However, in today's contemporary world, the challenges in one region are vastly different from another. The enemy's strategic end state, operational framework, and the type of warfare utilized vary, and are often unpredictable. As stated in the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the "United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate." The *Quadrennial Defense Review*'s theme regarding the ambiguity of the future operational environment is further complemented by the 2012 *NDS* document. The *NDS* concludes that the operational environment of today's world presents an increasingly complex set of challenges. Thus, the U.S. Army must be ready to face challenges and threats in an unpredictable environment.

Based on the *Quadrennial Defense Review* and *NDS*, it is clear why the Army shifted to the operational approach of Unified Land Operations, with the Army focusing on capabilities necessary to be successful in offensive, defensive, and stability operations (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-3-2-6). This demonstrates a focus on capabilities,



rather than an army built and designed to defeat a specific threat. The movement towards a capabilities based force from a threat-based force is not new. Since October 2001, senior army leaders concentrated their efforts on identifying the necessary capabilities to fill operational gaps in order to be successful in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's response to an identified capability gap between its lethal, survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility, resulted in the development of the Stryker brigades and their six-wheeled vehicular platform. The Army's modularity transformation program attempted to provide flexible and responsive capabilities to Joint Force Commanders with the required type of forces (Department of the Army 2008c, vii).

Analyzing what general capabilities a military needs only goes so far before the inevitable question of whom they are focusing their capabilities and training against becomes relevant. This is why military experts such as Michael Horowitz, Dan Shalmon, and Thomas Barnett have attempted to answer the question of which type of threat and warfare the U.S. is most likely to face in the future. According to Horwitz and Shalmon's article, "The Future of War and American Military Strategy," as long as the U.S remains a military superpower, the U.S. military will face an enemy that utilizes irregular warfare in an attempt to neutralize the sheer size and might of U.S. forces. That being true, they also believe, however, even given the unlikelihood of conventional warfare, an inability to defeat a traditional military force is a far greater threat to national security (Horwitz and Shalmon 2009, 306-308). Barnett's view slightly differs in that he sees the enemy threat as a larger global phenomenon. In his view, the greatest threat is what he describes as the "Gap Nations." This refers to the part of the world that has been left out of the

globalization of North America, Europe, and Asia. According to Barnett, these areas foster terrorist organizations whose guerrilla warfare, or insurgencies, gain control over the populace and eventually conduct spectacular attacks on those they view as their enemies, the Non-Gap or Core Nations (Barnett 2005, 31-42). Other military experts believe, in an attempt to avoid a long, drawn out conflict, the U.S. will no longer commit ground forces to prolonged irregular warfare conflict. Rather, the tactical application of drone strikes will be the preferred method of providing U.S. support for these low-intensity conflicts. The debate over the most likely threat U.S. military forces will face, and the type of warfare they will conduct, is still ongoing amongst many military experts. Unfortunately, only when or if the next conflict occurs, will these predictions be confirmed or disproved. Regardless, a decision on what type or types of enemy threats must be identified in order to prepare the military for future conflicts.

In the DoD 2012 White Paper, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*, the U.S. military's primary missions are clearly laid out and correlate with the types of enemy threats the U.S. may face in the near future. For example, the first mission described in the report is counterterrorism and irregular warfare. This indicates concurrence with Horwitz and Shalmon's prediction of irregular warfare as the most likely enemy threat. It is important to note that stability operations and COIN, though on the list, are lower in priority. In relationship to these types of operations, the document states that the U.S. "will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. forces commitments to stability operations" (Department of Defense 2012, 6). This is a clear indicator that, although irregular warfare is a high priority and

can be perceived as the most likely threat, COIN operations must be handled differently than how they were implemented in OEF and OIF. Other more conventional operations, such as countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), remain a primary mission. This indicates a need to maintain a force capable of defeating peer military forces and threats. It is also important to note that new types of threats have emerged or regained attention. The need to defend our system and operate effectively in cyberspace has become a concern as the reliance on technology increases within our nation and our military. The ability of U.S. forces to rapidly deploy, construct effective communication, deliver logistical support, and take action, demonstrates the important role the military has in conducting humanitarian and disaster relief operations. In the past five years, military aircraft have air-dropped relief supplies into Ethiopia, delivered aid into remote villages in Sudan, rescued flood victims in Bangladesh, rushed pharmaceuticals to earthquake sites, and delivered medical teams to hundreds of major and minor disasters. The White Paper concludes by stating that these missions will greatly determine the design of the future force.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept* (AOC), further describes how, in the future operational environment, Army forces will conduct operations to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies. It states that the Army's future operational environment will be complex, uncertain, change rapidly, and contain a wide range of threats. It describes potential threats in three important categories that can be utilized in shaping the focus of the Army: most likely, most dangerous, and dangerous alternative. Complementary to the DoD 2012 White Paper, the AOC states that violent extremism remains the most likely threat to U.S. interests. Extremism, as defined

by the AOC, can manifest in the form of violent individuals, non-state actors, or state sponsored proxies carrying out violent acts in support of an extremist agenda. Faced with the conventional forces of the U.S Army, these extremists utilize terrorist tactics and irregular warfare as a means toward their strategic ends. The most dangerous threat to the U.S. national security is a nation state possessing both conventional and WMD capabilities with the desire to use them against the U.S. or its allies. As viewed by Horwitz and Shalmon, the greatest risk to U.S. national security would be the U.S. military's inability to defeat conventional enemy forces (Horwitz and Shalmon 2009). The threat of a nuclear strike by the belligerent party further justifies the need to maintain this capability. A dangerous alternative to these events is the threat of an individual or extremist organization employing a nuclear device in the U.S. As worldwide nuclear proliferation continues, adversarial regimes and extremist groups are likely to attempt gaining control of nuclear materials. This underscores the importance of the U.S. remaining vigilant against extremist individuals or organizations, with an army capable of conducting effective counterterrorist operations.

While developing the concept of Unified Land Operations, the Army further investigated the changing nature of future threats and the relationship to the operational environment. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, describes the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disrupted, and hybrid threat the Army could face in the future (Department of the Army 2008c, 1-13). In order to understand how these threats fit into their operational environment, Army doctrine placed them into a spectrum of conflict model that contains four benchmarks of conflict based on their level of violence in an area: (1) stable peace, (2) unstable peace, (3) insurgency, and (4) general war (Department of

the Army 2008c, 2-1). Stable peace is described as an area absent of military violence. In this theater of operation, international actors, such as the Department of State (DoS) and NGOs, conduct partnered activities with other political or economic parties. Unstable peace is described as an area where one or more parties threaten or use violence as a means to their ends. Military force is applied in a limited conflict environment in order to conduct irregular or unconventional warfare against the belligerent parties. Though it is a type of irregular warfare, insurgency is given its own description and level of violence due to the volatile nature of the conflict. Joint Publication 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, defines an insurgency as the organized movement of subversion and violence by a group, or movement that seeks to overthrow an established government or governing authority. Intervention by a foreign government or military force in an insurgency has a highly probable chance of escalating the instability of the region before peaceful resolution. Finally, general war is described in FM 3-0 as conflict between major powers in which the opposing forces have used all their resources, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. Violence has reached a level where only the defeat of the military forces of one or more of the belligerent parties will end the conflict. The Army's spectrum of conflict allows commanders and senior leaders to describe the operational environment in which the Army conducts operations (Department of the Army 2008c, 1-3-1-4).

Army forces must be able to conduct operations anywhere on the spectrum of conflict with the universal end state of reducing the violence and creating a stable peace. According to FM 3-0, all operations involve offensive, defensive, and stability missions to varying degrees. To place the correct focus needed for the specific operation, the Army

has developed operational themes that describe the types of major operations that will be conducted within the spectrum of conflict. Doctrinally they are divided into five operational themes: (1) peacetime military engagement, (2) limited intervention, (3) peace operations, (4) irregular warfare, and (5) major combat operations. Peacetime military engagement is intended to shape the security of an environment in the stable peace realm of the spectrum. It entails conducting multinational partnership training, security assistance, and recovery operations. Limited intervention operations are executed by Army forces to achieve a clearly defined end state and are generally limited in scope. These operations include show of force, foreign humanitarian assistance, tactical strikes and raids to eliminate WMD. Peace operations are the use of Army forces to contain conflict, redress the peace, shape the environment to support reconciliation, and rebuilding to transition the control to a legitimate government. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle amongst state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the populace. Insurgency, COIN, and unconventional warfare are the principal forms of warfare conducted in this type of conflict. Army forces conduct Foreign Internal Defense, COIN, and combating terrorism operations within this theme. Major Combat Operations (MCO) is the dominant theme during general war and encompasses the use of all levels of national power to defeat a belligerent nation, state, or hybrid threat (Department of the Army 2008c, 2-13).

Based on the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, *NDS*, DoD's 2012 White Paper, *AOC*, and FM 3-0, it becomes apparent to what the Army views as future emerging threats and their operational environment. As stated, the Army envisions itself as a force capable of conducting operations within the defined spectrum of conflict in complex and

unpredictable environments. This means the Army must be able to conduct peacetime military engagements and limited intervention operations in order to deter or prevent the escalation of violence within a region. Further along the spectrum of conflict, in order to address what the Army views as the most likely threat, the Army must be able to conduct irregular warfare to deter or defeat violent extremism in the form of violent individuals, non-state actors, or state sponsored proxies who desire to carry out violent or terrorist acts against the U.S. At the same time, it is essential that the Army remains prepared and able to conduct MCO at the other end of the spectrum, general war. The Army needs to remain the strongest military land force in the world in order to defeat belligerent conventional military force, in which a defeat would pose the greatest threat to national security. Due to the complexity of the operational environment and the danger posed by a nuclear strike, it is essential for the Army to possess the ability to conduct operations that prevent other nations or non-state actors from obtaining WMD. Finally, while the military has always focused on maintaining land, sea, and air superiority, future conflicts will require a focus on achieving superiority over cyberspace and the information-operating environment. It is therefore vital that the Army is trained, equipped, and prepared to confront each of these threats in future conflicts, in order to achieve success in an uncertain environment.

#### Combatant Commander's Requirements

Comprehending the potential threats and their operating environment is only part of understanding what the future challenges to the Army will be. The Unified Command Plan and associated COCOMs provide operational instructions and command and control to the armed forces in order to meet their mission requirements. COCOMs are

responsible for utilizing and integrating air, land, sea, and amphibious forces under their commands, to achieve U.S. national security objectives while protecting national interests (Feickert 2013, 2). Understanding how COCOMs meet the challenges in their respective Area of Responsibility (AOR) is essential as it directly impacts how the Army is organized, trained, and resourced. The Army remains the U.S.' principal land force; organized, trained, and equipped for prompt and sustained combat or stability operations. Its core mission is to defeat enemy land forces, seize, hold, and defend land areas, and provide forces for long term area security operations abroad (Department of Defense 2010a, 6). The Army must also provide the capabilities required by the COCOMs in order to remain relevant and meet specific worldwide mission requirements.

The Unified Command Plan is a classified presidentially approved document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), outlining basic guidance to all COCOMs. It establishes missions, responsibilities, and force structure. It also delineates the general geographical AOR for the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCs), and specifies functional responsibilities for the Functional Combatant Commanders (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, 385). COCOMs are the highest level military commanders that enforce national policy and implement national resources to meet strategic objectives. COCOMs employ military force through the military service components assigned to them. Each COCOM has an Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force service component assigned to provide forces and serve as the service headquarters. Since September 2011, there are nine COCOMs as specified in Title 10 and the 2013 Unified Command Plan. Six have geographic responsibilities, and three have functional responsibilities.



GCCs are responsible for stability and security in their assigned regions. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is responsible for the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Alaska, Bahamas and the surrounding bodies of water. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is responsible for the Caribbean and South America and its associated waters encompassing more than 30 countries. Responsibility for the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa belongs to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Responsibility for Europe, Greenland, the Caucasuses, Israel, Russia and Eurasia belongs to U.S. European Command (EUCOM). U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is responsible for the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii, Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Antarctica. The newest GCC, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in October 2007. AFRICOM takes over the role of stability and security in Africa from both EUCOM and CENTCOM.




Figure 2. 2012 Geographic Combatant Commands Areas of Responsibility

Source: Department of the Army, "Organizations," <http://www.army.mil/info/organization/> (accessed 23 February 2013).

Functional Combatant Commanders operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to GCCs and the services. The U.S. Special Operations Command's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip Special Operations Forces and provide those forces to the GCC, under whose operational control they serve. U.S. Strategic Command's primary responsibility is to detect, deter, and prevent WMD attacks against the U.S. and to join with the other COCOMs to defend the nation should deterrence fail. Specific responsibilities include planning, synchronizing, advocating, and employing capabilities to meet the U.S.'s strategic deterrence; space operations; cyberspace operations; global strike; missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and combating WMD. The U.S. Transportation Command's mission is to direct the joint deployment and distribution enterprise to globally project strategic national security capabilities and provide end-to-end distribution process visibility, to support other COCOMs.

COCOMs are required to report to Congress on a regular basis. Part of the report includes a threat assessment and their strategy to meet current and future threats. These commanders are not responsible for determining Army force structure. However, the COCOM's unique responsibility and position provide the most accurate source of threat information and capabilities required to meet those threats. As a result, COCOM's reports to Congress hold a significant impact over Army force structure and articulate capabilities needed from the services to meet their AOR requirements. Due to the specific mission of the Strategic Command, Transportation Command, and the unique mission set of the Special Operations Command, this research will focus on the requirements of the

six GCCs. The following is a summary of the specific mission, operational environment, and consequent requirements from each of the GCCs.

### U.S. Central Command

CENTCOM is responsible for extremely contested regions of the world. From the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, to the troubling U.S. relationships with Pakistan and Iran, and unstable countries like Egypt and Syria, CENTCOM conducts operations in an area plagued with terrorist organizations and uncooperative state and non-state actors. Since 11 September 2001, CENTCOM oversaw operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally since October 2002, CENTCOM conducted operations on the Horn of Africa to assist the countries of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia in their efforts to combat terrorism, establish a secure environment, and foster regional stability. These operations primarily took the form of humanitarian assistance, crisis management, and a variety of Civil Affairs (CA) programs. In his 2012 Posture Statement, U.S. Marine Corps General James Mattis, current commander of CENTCOM stated, “In over 30 years of supporting U.S. forces in the Central Command area of responsibility, I have never witnessed it so tumultuous” (CENTCOM 2012, 2).

The region remains, despite all the internal challenges and instability, strategically important to the U.S. Other than the historical partnership with countries within the region, this area contains the world’s largest energy reserves. Several countries, like Egypt, have long supported and facilitated U.S. interests in the Middle East. CENTCOM’s Posture Statement explains their strategy with dealing with these challenges, while securing U.S interests in the AOR. It states “CENTCOM’s strategic approach is to build and maintain a robust and flexible force posture that promotes

regional stability through relationships with key allies and partners” (CENTCOM 2012, 9). This is accomplished by maintaining a force to conduct military-to-military engagements in order to build trust between nations and work toward developing a secure environment. CENTCOMs objectives are to build host nation capacity and competencies through joint training events, professional military education, foreign military sales, bilateral and multilateral agreements and exercises. This continued military-to-military engagement facilitates a presence in the region, which ultimately leads to the protection of U.S. interests, deters future conflict, and provides access for forces, allowing rapid response to unforeseen crises. This includes sending forces to assist in the disaster relief operations after the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, or assisting with the evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon in 2006. It also builds competent partners who are capable of taking the lead on issues of mutual interest. CENTCOM also fully acknowledges that each country is unique and requires a tailored approach and force structure to achieve their strategic objectives (CENTCOM 2012, 9-14).

CENTCOM must also maintain a force that can respond to emerging challenges caused by terrorist organizations or unstable regional governments. The 2011 Syrian Civil War provides evidence of the need for such a force. As a result of the Syrian regime’s military actions toward its population, the United Nations, as well as the U.S., have disavowed the government and supported the rebellion. The efforts of the Syrian rebellion are commendable, but their options and capabilities to adequately defeat the Syrian government are extremely limited. Furthermore, along with its military forces, the Syrian regime has a sizeable arsenal of chemical-biological weapons, a significant integrated air defense system, and thousands of shoulder-launched anti-air missiles.

Without the threat of direct intervention of U.S. forces, the Syrian regime may have used chemical weapons and other extreme means to defeat the rebellion. Of great concern to CENTCOM is Syria's support of known Iranian Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), its support of weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and its cooperation with Al-Qaida in Iraq operatives (CENTCOM 2013). Should the need arise, CENTCOM must be ready to address these threats with a formidable military force capable of decisive victory. To accomplish this, CENTCOM will partner with the DoS to promote stability within the region in order to enhance the security as they focus on defeating terrorist organizations and VEOs that threaten U.S. interests and homeland. As a major objective, CENTCOM will be postured to counter the proliferation, acquisition, and use of WMD throughout the AOR (CENTCOM 2012, 11).

To achieve their objectives CENTCOM will require land forces that are able to conduct irregular warfare against terrorist origination and VEOs. Of particular importance is the ability to conduct precision strikes on terrorist networks and high valued targeted individuals. The threat of conventional forces still remains in the AOR, and as long as there are countries that have or attempt to gain WMD, CENTCOM will require a land force prepared to fight and win in conventional warfare. Additionally, CENTCOM requires forces that are able to develop and train host nation militaries to build partnered relationships. This force must be knowledgeable in the culture, lifestyle, and unique circumstances of the host nation. Finally, CENTCOM forces must be able to work with host nation governments and be interoperable with DoS and other government agencies, in order to achieve a common end state.

### U.S. Pacific Command

Within the Asian-Pacific region lies the world's largest populated areas, three of the world's largest economies, the largest militaries, and three nuclear-armed states. It also contains the troubling Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which aspires to be a nuclear power. Though the area has remained relatively peaceful for the past six decades, any internal instability or conflicts within the region will have a significant impact on U.S. national security and interests. Additionally, China's relationship with the U.S. remains extremely complicated, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's new leader, Kim Jong-un, has shown evidence of aggression towards the U.S. and increased his efforts to become a nuclear power. With the anticipated conclusion of OEF in 2014, President Obama has directed his national security team to make America's "presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority" (PACOM 2012, 2).

In his last report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Robert Willard, the current PACOM Commander, identified several security challenges within the region. These include China's military modernization and active development of capabilities in the cyber and space domains. Over the past few years, China produced great quantities of advanced aircraft, missiles, electronic warfare systems, and other specialized military equipment. Its shipyards are currently building six classes of modern submarines, destroyers, and frigates. North Korea's nuclear aspirations with vocal threats towards the U.S. and South Korea have the potential to cause regional instability. There are also several states and non-state actors that threaten U.S. maritime and air space access throughout the region, including cyberspace security. Additionally, the need to maintain and strengthen U.S. alliances and partnerships within the region remains a top

priority. In order to meet these challenges, PACOM stated a need to increase force posture closer to the Southeast Asia and South Asia regions in order to rapidly respond to the demands of the AOR (PACOM 2012, 2-4).

PACOM's AOR is often viewed as a maritime operational environment. However, the majority of the militaries in the region are army centric. This generates a requirement for a robust and agile Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces presence in the AOR that can deter, and if necessary defeat, emerging threats. Permanent basing, currently available in Japan and South Korea, historically provided access to this part of the world. They constitute the front line of defense for the U.S. homeland and host nations of Japan and South Korea. These permanent bases not only provide regional deterrence against actors such as North Korea, but also the ability to rapidly respond to natural disasters and other contingencies that occur in the Asia Pacific. Along with posturing forces to deter or defeat threatening armies, it is vital for the security and stability of the region for U.S. land forces to build a partnership with allied military forces (PACOM 2012, 4-8).

As previously stated, North Korea remains a major concern to PACOM as they continue to show evidence of being the most likely threat to the U.S. and its allies. North Korea's conventional military forces pose a great threat, especially to South Korea. Tensions between North Korea and the U.S. only worsen as their nuclear program gains momentum. Other than maintaining a force capable of deterring and defeating the North Korean conventional military, PACOM requires robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to monitor North Korea's military and provide early warning of unfavorable developments. PACOM must maintain a comprehensive counter WMD

program to support counter-proliferation interdiction operations. These operations include both ground and air forces. To complement this endeavor, PACOM coordinates with the U.S. Department of Energy to establish “centers of excellence” with both China and India to promote effective nuclear security and safeguards. This requires military land forces capable of interagency coordination in order to synchronize efforts and meet the U.S. strategic goals (PACOM 2013).

Other unique challenges, such as natural disasters and complex relationships within the region, have demonstrated a need for other capabilities. PACOM was able to provide disaster relief support to Japan immediately after their epic triple disaster in eastern Honshu that occurred on 11 March 2011. A massive earthquake off the shore of Japan triggered powerful tsunami waves. The tsunami caused a nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex (CNN 2011). This required land forces that were trained and equipped to conduct such operations and will remain an enduring requirement. PACOM has also worked to increase China’s participation in regional and international security activities. Bilateral military dialogues with China provide important opportunities to discuss U.S. concerns, as well as provide a conduit to explore areas of future cooperation. This requires expertise in Chinese military structure and internal security departments. PACOM also requires forces that can work with DoS and comprehend the dynamic relationship between China and Taiwan. Additionally, as Russia reemerges as a military power, PACOM must conduct military-to-military engagements to foster cooperation and trust between the two post-Cold War countries (PACOM 2012, 8-10).



To achieve their objectives, PACOM will require land forces that are able to conduct operations against conventional forces, such as North Korea and China. U.S. land forces must also be able to defend against complex and sophisticated cyber attacks. Land forces must not only be postured to deter aggression from uncooperative actors, but rapidly respond to emerging natural disasters to assist U.S. allies in the region. Additionally, these land forces must be able to conduct patterned military-to-military operations with a wide variety of nations, to build cooperation and partners within the region. This requires a comprehensive understanding of the many facets of the AOR. Finally, PACOM will require military land forces that are capable of working with other government and non-government agencies to support U.S. goals and strategic endeavors.

#### U.S. Africa Command

Through shared economic, political, and security interests, the U.S. is increasingly connected to the continent of Africa. The mission of AFRICOM is to protect and defend those interests by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations. AFRICOM is charged with conducting military operations to deter and defeat transnational threats, in order to provide a security environment conducive to strong governance and development (AFRICOM 2013). General Carter F. Ham, the current AFRICOM commander, outlined AFRICOM's priority based on the current strategic environment of Africa in his March 2012 Posture Statement. This statement focuses on four cornerstones: countering terrorism and VEOs, countering piracy and illicit trafficking, partnering to strengthen defense capabilities, and responding to crises (AFRICOM 2012, 4-6).

A principal focus of AFRICOM will be partnering and working with African security forces to deter or defeat threats posed by Al Qaida and other extremist organizations. AFRICOM will work to deny terrorist organizations safe havens within the continent and prevent their destabilizing activities. AFRICOM's focus of this effort remains on deterring and defeating VEO in Somalia, Mali, Algeria, and Nigeria. In particular, the focus will be on addressing the security challenges of Al Qaida and its affiliates in East Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel (AFRICOM 2012, 6-8).

Somalia remains of great concern to AFRICOM. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, more commonly known as al-Shabaab, is the Somalia based militant Islamist terrorist organization that was formally recognized by Al Qaida in 2012. Al-Shabaab presents both a terrorist threat to the U.S. and its regional interests as well as an insurgent problem to the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabaab's overarching goal is to gain control of Somali territory by overthrowing the Transitional Federal Government. In North and West Africa, the terrorist organization Al Qaida, in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, focuses not only on overthrowing the government of Algeria, but also on the stated intent to attack Western targets. This group is able to use the ungoverned parts of Maghreb and Sahel as a safe haven. Africa's most populated nation, Nigeria, is the source of 8 to 11 percent of U.S. oil imports. Recently the country experienced a significant decline in security as demonstrated by a steep increase in the number of terrorist attacks by the Islamic sect Boko Haram. Boko Haram's goals are to wage a war against the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to create a "pure" Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Though the group is not interested in attacking Western interests, in August 2011, they were responsible for an attack on the United Nations mission in Abuja,

killing 25 and injuring more than 80 individuals. This increase in violence has created great instability within the region (AFRICOM 2012, 8-10).

AFRICOM's strategy for countering VEOs places great emphasis on regional cooperation between the DoS, the host nation and their security forces, and U.S. forces. For example, Mauritania and Mali forces have participated in AFRICOM's annual Flintlock Exercise designed to build counterterrorism capacity. In June of 2011, these two forces collaborated in an operation to destroy an Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb camp in northern Mali. To continue these endeavors, AFRICOM will require land forces capable of conducting irregular warfare in conjunction with Special Operations Forces units, DoS, and host nation security forces. U.S. forces must also be able to partner with, develop, and build the capacity of host nation security forces (AFRICOM 2012, 9-10).

Along with assisting African partners to develop the capabilities to defeat VEOs, AFRICOM works to build Africa's ability to combat piracy, illicit trafficking, and prevent conflict. As a priority, AFRICOM is increasing stability by strengthening Africa's defense capabilities, which create the conditions conducive to future development. Furthermore, building Africa's military and police forces promote the sharing of costs and responsibility for security on the continent. Small teams led by U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations components, with a small footprint, conduct the majority of this training. As a result of this effort, many African countries have provided forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia, as well as other peacekeeping operations. AFRICOM military advisors have emphasized protection in order to support African security forces in their efforts to provide civilian safety and security. Additionally, Headquarters, Department of the Army selected U.S. Army Africa

to conduct the pilot Regionally-Aligned Brigade (RAB) rotation in 2013. The RAB, are conventional forces, trained to support U.S. AFRICOM's validated requirements for security cooperation activities throughout Africa (AFRICOM 2012, 15-19).

Finally, due to the dynamic security environment, AFRICOM must ensure that its forces are prepared to conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and a wide range of other contingency operations. As an example, in October 2011 at the end of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Libya operations, AFRICOM rapidly established a Joint Task Force (JTF) to lead post conflict U.S. operations related to Libya. JTF Odyssey Guard provided direct support to the DoS as it reopened the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. The JTF also provided explosive ordnance disposal assistance, personal security escorts, and ensured that the chemical weapons in Waddan were monitored and secured (AFRICOM 2012, 19-22).

To be a responsive force capable of conducting all types of operations necessary in the AOR, AFRICOM requires a robust and agile land component. This force must be trained and equipped to conduct irregular warfare against VEOs, and able to conduct joint partnered operations in accordance with host nation and DoS. Additionally, the land force must be able to adequately train, shape, and develop Africa's internal security force in accordance with the desires of the host nation. This requires a comprehensive understanding of the AOR, the host nation government, and its military structure. Finally, land forces must be able to work concurrently with DoS and other NGOs in order to rapidly provide support for humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

## U.S. Southern Command

United States Marine Corps General John F. Kelly, the current SOUTHCOM Commander, states in his 2012 Posture Statement that “the key to our [SOUTHCOM] defense-in-depth approach to Central America, South America, and the Caribbean has been persistent, sustained, engagement, which support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives by strengthening the security capacities of partner nations” (SOUTHCOM 2012, 2). Kelly expresses that this requires an in depth understanding of U.S. government capabilities and interagency coordination in order to implement a whole-of-government solution to address the challenges in SOUTHCOM’s AOR. These challenges include the instability of regional security, created by criminal organizations, drug trafficking, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, and other such events. Unchecked, these threats pose a danger to U.S. national security and harbor the support of its enemies and the growth of terrorist originations (SOUTHCOM 2012, 2-4).

While SOUTHCOM is not concerned with traditional opposing military forces, Transnational Organized Crime (T.O.C.) has emerged as a volatile and destabilizing threat to the security of the region (SOUTHCOM 2012, 4). These T.O.C.s specialize in the illicit trafficking of drugs and other black market items throughout the AOR and into the U.S. Additionally, T.O.C.s fund regional insurgency efforts like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, which thrive in areas absent of the rule of law. Even more concerning are the T.O.C.’s ability to launder money of other terrorist organizations and transcend their influence past geographical and political boundaries to support organizations like Hezbollah. At the same time, these organizations are receiving support from countries like Iran and China. The Joint Interagency Task Force South, a

subordinate command of SOUTHCOM, is charged with counter illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets (SOUTHCOM 2013). This unit relies heavily on the cooperation and authority of various agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security (SOUTHCOM 2012, 3). Simultaneously, the U.S. military commits a variety of forces in the region in order to support this SOUTHCOM's mission. These forces range from the U.S. Coast Guard patrolling the waters in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific, to military aircraft conducting detection and monitoring missions (SOUTHCOM 2012, 27-28).

Along with the threat created by T.O.C.s, SOUTHCOM's AOR is susceptible to natural disasters ranging from earthquakes, wild fires, floods, and volcanic eruptions. The devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti demonstrated the important role the U.S. military has in executing disaster relief operations in SOUTHCOM's AOR. Through multinational training exercises and security cooperation activities, SOUTHCOM has worked on increasing U.S forces and host nations humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities. SOUTHCOM's humanitarian assistance efforts focus on the provision of health care, infrastructure improvements, and aid to populations temporarily or chronically unable to provide basic human needs. SOUTHCOM's disaster relief efforts focus on reducing human suffering associated with natural disasters that have destroyed infrastructure, disrupted transportation and commerce networks. SOUTHCOM also hosts and executes several annual humanitarian assistance exercises. During these exercises, U.S. military forces conduct training while simultaneously providing tangible benefits to

the host nation by building medical clinics, schools, wells, and community centers. For example in 2011, U.S. Army South, SOUTHCOM's Army Component Command, conducted exercises "Beyond the Horizon" and "New Horizons" in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. A critical part of these missions was the medical readiness training exercises resulting in the treatment of 85,364 patients. These missions not only provided the support needed by many of the countries in the AOR, but also increased the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities of SOUTHCOM (SOUTHCOM 2012, 17-19).

As stated by the SOUTHCOM Commander, interagency collaboration and multinational military-to-military engagement make up the cornerstone of SOUTHCOM's mission. Every year SOUTHCOM sponsors seven military exercises specifically designed to facilitate interoperability, build capabilities, and provide venues to share best practices among the military and security forces in the AOR. These exercises are designed to improve partner nations' capacity to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations to bring stability to the AOR. Additionally, in partnership with the DoS and host countries, SOUTHCOM monitors, reports, and analyzes developments in international human rights across the AOR. SOUTHCOM continues to build networks and partnerships throughout the region in order to open up opportunities that foster an understanding and respect for human rights. Effective peace keeping and humanitarian efforts would not be possible without building partner nation capacity and enhancing interoperability through interagency, host nation's government, and their militaries (SOUTHCOM 2012, 20).

Based on the threats and challenges facing the region, SOUTHCOM will require specific capabilities from its land forces. In accordance with the *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (T.O.C.)* 2011 White Paper, the enhancement of intelligence collection, analysis, and counterintelligence on T.O.C. entities will be essential to defeat these threats. SOUTHCOM will require Army forces that are capable of facilitating or supporting Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection on T.O.C. threats, especially those with the potential role of facilitating transportation or utilization of WMD (White House 2011, 17). It is essential for these forces to be interdependent on other organization such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency. It is also necessary for these forces to communicate and share information with host nation authorities and military organizations. The Army must also be able to provide forces that, in conjunction with IGOs and host nation, can attack drug trafficking and distribution networks by direct or indirect means. To meet these requirements, it is critical for Army forces to have explicit knowledge of these T.O.C.s' money trafficking means and abilities, communication networks, and internal leadership. These forces are obligated to have a complete understanding of the region or host nation in order to counter T.O.C activities while avoiding undue harm to the legitimate local economy, government, and social order. Additionally, regional instability caused by weak or failing governments, insurgents capitalizing on human suffrage, or crippling natural disasters, creates an environment in which T.O.C prospers. To combat this, SOUTHCOM will require land forces that are trained and proficient in peace keeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations. The cornerstone of SOUTHCOM remains its partnership with



host nations' government and military forces to promote national partnership, security, and stability throughout the AOR. Army forces must be proficient in working with, supporting, and training allied military forces and government agencies.

### U.S. Northern Command

NORTHCOM's geographic AOR, the continental U.S., Alaska, Canada, Mexico, the Bahamas and surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida, shapes its unique mission and role regarding national defense. Its primary mission is to defend the U.S. homeland. However, since the U.S. shares the continent with Mexico and Canada, NORTHCOM has developed special relationships and cooperative efforts with these countries for mutual security interest. Additionally, NORTHCOM is charged with mobilizing forces to respond to natural and manmade disasters within the AOR. NORTHCOM is also responsible for working with the Department of Homeland Security to prevent, deter, and if needed respond, to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

General Charles H. Jacoby is the current commander of both NORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a separate command that is neither a subordinate nor a direct subordinate headquarters of NORTHCOM. Both of these commands' missions are not only complementary, but are interdependent upon one another. As such, much of the NORAD internal organization is comprised of both U.S. and Canadian military personnel. NORAD's primary mission is to provide aerospace warning, control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America. This NORAD mission directly addresses one of NORTHCOM'S primary threats - ballistic missiles. NORTHCOM, in conjunction with NORAD, is responsible for

directing missile defense operations to protect the U.S. and Canada from ballistic missile threats while assisting the Missile Defense Agency in developing improved capability (NORTHCOM 2013). According to the 2012 NORTHCOM posture report, this requires an integration of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, including Ground-Based Interceptor sites, but more importantly, missile and air defense military experts (NORTHCOM 2012, 5-6). The U.S. Army remains the military component for air missile defense. As such, NORTHCOM will look to U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command to provide the capabilities and manpower needed to support the missile defense mission.

NORTHCOM is also responsible for other security and national needs. These include: Cyber Security, Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Operations, and Civil Support (NORTHCOM 2013). Cyber Security is a growing critical mission of NORTHCOM. Since both NORTHCOM and NORAD depend upon the Internet, communications network systems, and critical infrastructure to complete their mission, a cyber attack poses a grave risk to the ability to defend against attacks. Therefore, NORTHCOM requires a skilled cyber military workforce to enhance mission assurance and resiliency. It is essential for NORTHCOM to remain vigilant to terrorist attacks that will attempt to weaken or cripple U.S. military forces. NORTHCOM must also address the growing concern of T.O.Cs, particularly those moving through Mexico. Therefore NORTHCOM requires Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection military experts to examine available threat information and implement mitigation measures to best protect the homeland (NORTHCOM 2012, 10-12).

NORTHCOM is also the key component for operations within the U.S. NORTHCOM is responsible for addressing any catastrophic natural or manmade events,

such has hurricanes or a chemical attack, on U.S. soil. In support of this mission, NORTHCOM has implemented a Dual-Status Commander Concept of Operations, which provides greater unity of effort between federal and state military forces and other organizations, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency. NORTHCOM has also implemented a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise that is able to deliver lifesaving capability faster than what was previously fielded. To accomplish this, NORTHCOM requires land forces with specialized skills, capabilities, and capacities that can rapidly stabilize and mitigate the effects of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear attack in the wake of catastrophic events. It also requires that these forces are able to synchronize multiple government and non-government agencies in a whole-of-government approach to address crises (NORTHCOM 2012, 12-14).

#### U.S. European Command

Unlike the previous GCCs, the countries that comprise EUCOM's AOR are relatively stable developed nations, with the means to defend themselves against external threats. Therefore, EUCOM's mission is vastly different from the other COCOMs, with greater emphasis placed on maintaining and building international partners and force posturing for rapid deployment. Its mission is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the U.S. interest (EURCOM 2013). Partnering with established allies fosters cooperative solutions to mutual security challenges. Additionally, EUCOM is the U.S.'s military face to the NATO alliance, which is one of the most successful and

important alliances in history. EUCOM remains an active part of the NATO coalition in order to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Admiral James Stavridis, the current EUCOM Commander, outlined several objectives in his 2012 Posture Statement. A key objective is to maintain a European based force to support NATO operations, while focusing on allied and partner training designed to enhance interoperability. Maintaining a European based force facilitates the relationships between EUCOM and partner nations. This requires forces, particularly land forces, that are able to train partner nation's militaries, and when necessary instruct them to build capacity in various types of missions—from combat and COIN operations to cyber security and logistics. Alongside other NATO troops, EUCOM forces must be capable of conducting peace operations throughout the region. Additionally, EUCOM forces must also be able to provide humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development in response to natural disasters (EUCOM 2012, 6).

Another key objective for EUCOM is to maintain U.S. strategic access across Europe in support of U.S. global operations. For example, EUCOM has conducted a wide range of activities to support the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Ninety percent of non-U.S. troops contributing to the International Security Assistance Force come from European based allies. EUCOM has actively supported U.S. allies and partners, assisting in identifying pre-deployment training and equipment requirements, and leveraging a number of programs to assist these countries in meeting those requirements. Furthermore, the European theater is located in or adjacent to three continents; Europe, Asia, and Africa, which is a critical strategic crossroad. Freedom of access in Europe allows U.S. and NATO forces to move across the AOR in support of the

other COCOMs in these vital areas. Operations in Libya in 2011 validated the critical importance of maintaining strong relationships across Europe for basing, access, and force contributions (EUCOM 2012, 2-5).

Admiral Stavridis also highlights that, as issues arise in EUCOM's region, assessing the situation is not handled or addressed in a vacuum. EUCOM ensures that it takes a whole-of-government approach to address its regional and global issues. This is accomplished by integrating academia, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector. This requires forces that are able to work in conjunction with, not only U.S., but European governmental and non-governmental agencies. Furthermore, to become a more effective force, U.S. forces must work to become interoperable with these U.S. and European agencies. It is through this collaboration that EUCOM can conduct a full spectrum of activities to secure enduring stability in Europe (EUCOM 2012, 66-67).

#### Mission Essential Task List Analysis

Examining both the potential enemy threats as well as the specific needs of the GCCs generate a basis or foundation of what the Army must be prepared to respond to. This analysis produces a list of the types of operations or tasks that ground forces must perform to meet future challenges. The Army has concluded, based on the potential enemy operational environments, that land forces are required to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations along a defined spectrum of conflict. This mandates that land forces are manned, equipped, and trained to conduct all three types of operations in stable peace, unstable peace, insurgency, or general war environments. Additionally, land forces must be prepared to decisively defeat enemy conventional forces, irregular forces, or a hybrid threat model. To help shape priorities, the Army has recognized

irregular warfare and counter insurgency operations as the most likely threat. However, the Army stated that conventional force-on-force operations, conducted with an actor who possesses WMD, is the most dangerous threat and the Army's no-fail mission.

The GCCs have generated a separate list of operations, or tasks, for land forces to perform in order to meet the challenges of their specific AOR. Several requirements are similar across all the GCCs. Each has identified a need for land forces to become interdependent on U.S. government and non-government agencies to facilitate a whole-of-government approach to future challenges. They also require land forces to partner with, develop, and train host nation forces, in order to build their capacity and promote shared responsibility of security endeavors. Each GCC identifies a need to rapidly respond to natural disasters and humanitarian assistance missions. Priorities of these requirements vary from each command. AFRICOM, for example, places a high priority on partnering with African military forces to promote peace and stability within the region. However, NORTHCOM's partnering with Canada is nearly inherent, thus it provides a supporting role to their mission and requires less emphasis. Instead, NORTHCOM places increased emphases on disaster relief operations, whereas SOUTHCOM is focused mainly on humanitarian assistance operations.

Other requirements are unique to specific GCCs, or have a different prioritization. CENTCOM views terrorist organizations as the greatest enemy threat in their AOR. Therefore, it places higher emphasis on land forces ability to conduct irregular warfare, as well as achieve victory in a COIN environment. PACOM's AOR is comprised of the largest number of foreign military forces, and therefore has a much greater concern with conventional force-on-force conflicts. This is further exacerbated by the recent (2013)

provoking acts of North Korea. The isolation and deterrence of T.O.C.s, due to their ability to destabilize a region as well as fund extremist organizations, is a major priority for SOUTHCOM. In order to maintain peace and stability within the continent of Africa, AFRICOM views the deterrence of ethnic cleansing and VEOs as a major priority. EUCOM views the maintenance of a force footprint to support NATO missions as one of their top priorities.

These requirements add to the list of the types of operations ground forces must perform to meet the challenges of the 21st century. To address all these requirements, the Army has developed a comprehensive list of tasks known as the Army Universal Task List. The Army Universal Task List addresses all tasks required previously for full spectrum operations, now referred to as Unified Land Operations. The Army can also reference additional joint tasks from the Universal Joint Task List. The Universal Joint Task List is a menu of tasks understood by each branch of the armed forces and serves as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across a wide range of military operations. The Universal Joint Task List also includes doctrinal terms and missions that are associated with, adopted, and used by NATO forces. However, not every unit will be proficient, or train on, every listed task in the Army Universal Task List or the Universal Joint Task List. The Army has instead assigned a specific task, known as a Mission Essential Task (MET), to each unit in order to focus their training. METs represent a task a unit could perform based on its design, equipment, and manning, for a specified mission. This generates the unit's METL (Department of the Army 2012b, 3-5).

Prior to 2011, Army units would normally develop two separate METLs, a Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) and a Directed Mission Essential Task List

(DMETL). A unit's CMETL is a list of a unit's core capability and general METs. Units train on CMETL tasks until the unit commander and next highest commander mutually decide to focus on training for a directed mission. A commander will transition from the CMETL to DMETL based on this decision. DMETL is a list of the METs a unit must perform to accomplish a directed mission. When a unit is assigned a mission, the commander develops a DMETL by adjusting the unit's CMETL based on the directed mission requirements. Once the DMETL is established, it focuses the unit's training program until mission completion (Department of the Army 2008b, 4-6).

In 2011, the Department of the Army began standardizing all brigade and higher units METLs. This was an attempt to help brigade and Echelon Above Brigade units identify the minimum fundamental doctrinal tasks necessary to perform the Army core competencies of both CAM and WAS in any operational environment. This methodology falls under the Army's concept of "decisive action," where the BCT can conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations along the spectrum of conflict. Battalion and company commanders develop their own unit METL by nesting with, and supporting their next higher unit's METL. Based on the unit's METL and the higher commander's guidance, the unit trains on the key collective tasks most important to the success of the mission, and linked to the probable mission expected to be conducted. Once developed, the unit METL provides the foundation for the unit's training strategy and subsequently, its training plan (Department of the Army 2012b, 3-2).

The BCT remains the centerpiece of the modularity system and their combat readiness is how the Army measures combat power. Focusing at the BCT level, the standardized METL for an IBCT, ABCT, and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the



maneuver BCTs, are identical. Their standardized METL is comprised of the following METs, expressed as Army Tactical Tasks: Conduct Mission Command, Conduct Offensive Operations, Conduct Defensive Operations, Conduct Security Operations, Conduct Stability Operations, Provide Fire Support, and (for Army National Guard only) Conduct Civil Support Operations (Army Training Network 2013). Under these METs are Task Groups that support a specific portion of a doctrinal capability. Each Task Group contains several supporting tasks that are made up of several collective and individual tasks. For example, the MET of Conduct Stability Operations, contains the Task Group of Coordinate Essential Services for Host Nation and Plan Restoration of Public Safety. The Task Group of Coordinate Essential Services for Host Nation contains the tasks of Conduct a Civil Military Operation, Secure Civilians During Operations, and Coordinate Civil Security. Conduct a Civil Military Operation includes the collective task of Develop an Information Collection Plan, which is directly tied to the individual task of Conduct a Civil Affairs Assessment (see figure 3).




Figure 3. MET Conduct Stability Operations

*Source:* Created by author.

The example below displays a Combined Arms Battalion and Infantry Company METLs that have been nested with the ABCT METL. These examples show the use of Army Tactical Tasks, Tasks Selections and Collective Tasks as METs (figure 4).

Armored Brigade Combat Team METL		Combined Arms Battalion METL		Infantry Company METL	
<b>MET 1: Conduct Mission Command</b>	<b>ART 5.0</b>	<b>MET 1: Conduct Mission Command</b>	<b>ART 5.0</b>	<b>MET 1: Conduct Mission Command</b>	<b>ART 5.0</b>
Task Group 1: Execute the Operations Process (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-5100	Execute the Operations Process (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-5100	Conduct Troop-leading Procedures (Platoon - Company)	07-2-5081
Task Group 2: Integrate Inform and Influence Activities (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-5300	Integrate Inform and Influence Activities (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-5300	<b>MET 2: Attack (CO)</b>	<b>71-TS-2875</b>
<b>MET 2: Conduct Offensive Operations</b>	<b>ART 7.1</b>	<b>MET 2: Conduct Offensive Operations</b>	<b>ART 7.1</b>	Conduct a Movement to Contact (Platoon - Company)	07-2-1090
Task Group 1: Conduct a Movement to Contact (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1072	Conduct a Movement to Contact (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1072	Conduct an Attack (Platoon - Company)	07-2-9001
Task Group 2: Conduct an Attack (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1092	Conduct an Attack (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1092	Breach an Obstacle (Platoon - Company)	17-2-3070
<b>MET 3: Conduct Defensive Operations</b>	<b>ART 7.2</b>	<b>MET 3: Conduct a Defense (Battalion - Brigade)</b>	<b>07-6-1028</b>	<b>MET 3: Defend (CO)</b>	<b>71-TS-2876</b>
Task Group 1: Conduct a Defense (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1028	Conduct Mobility, Countermobility, and or Survivability (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-6082	Conduct a Defense (Platoon - Company)	07-2-9003
<b>MET 4: Conduct Security Operations</b>	<b>ART 6.7.3</b>	Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance (Battalion - Brigade)	17-6-1007	Defend in an Urban Area (Platoon - Company)	07-2-1378
Task Group 1: Conduct Security Operations (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-6500	Conduct a Battle Handover	17-6-3809	Employ Snipers (Platoon - Company)	07-2-3018
Task Group 2: Conduct Area Security (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1272	Conduct Consolidation (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-5037	<b>MET 4: Conduct Security Operations</b>	<b>71-TS-2114</b>
<b>MET 5: Conduct Stability Operations</b>	<b>ART 7.3</b>	<b>MET 4: Conduct Security Operations</b>	<b>ART 6.7.3</b>	Conduct a Screen (Platoon - Company)	17-2-9225
Task Group 1: Coordinate Essential Services for Host Nation (Brigade - Corps)	71-8-7331	Conduct Security Operations (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-6500	Secure a Basecamp (Platoon - Company)	17-2-2633
Task Group 2: Plan Restoration of Public Safety (Brigade - Corps)	71-8-7321	Conduct Area Security (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1272	Secure civilians during operations (Platoon - Company)	07-2-4054
<b>MET 6: Provide Fire Support</b>	<b>ART 3.2</b>	<b>MET 5: Conduct Stability Operations</b>	<b>71-TS-1004</b>	Conduct Area Security (Platoon - Company)	07-2-1324
Task Group 1: Plan Fire Support (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-3000	Conduct a Civil Military Operation (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-4000	<b>MET 5: Integrate Indirect Fire Support (Platoon - Company)</b>	<b>07-2-3036</b>
		Conduct Area Security (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-1272	Conduct a Rehearsal (Platoon - Company)	07-2-5009
		Secure Civilians During Operations (Battalion - Brigade)	07-6-6073		
		Conduct Lines of Communication Security (Battalion - Brigade)	17-6-9406		
		Provide Interface or Liaison Among Military and Civilian Organizations (Battalion - Corps)	71-8-5410		
		<b>MET 6: Plan Fire Support (Battalion - Corps)</b>	<b>71-8-3000</b>		
		Prepare the Fire Support Plan	06-6-5062		
		Conduct Fire Support Planning	06-6-1118		
		Coordinate Target Attack	06-6-5059		
		Employ Fires	06-6-5066		
		Synchronize Close Air Support (Battalion - Brigade)	17-6-0308		

Figure 4. ABCT METL Example

Source: Army Training Network, “Unit Training Management Tutorial Brief,” <https://atn.army.mil> (accessed 13 March 2013).

Based on specific unit requirements, these Task Groups vary at some level from each of the three types of maneuver BCTs. For example, an IBCT that is airborne will have a Task Group of conducting an airborne assault, under the MET of conducting offensive operations. An ABCT, though it too has the MET of conducting offensive operations, is not designed to conduct airborne operations and therefore does not train on this particular Task Group.

Although the Army stated it must be an adaptive and flexible force, its capabilities and adaptability is largely based on how it is trained and equipped (Department of the Army 2012c, 11). The METLs of the Infantry, Armor, and Stryker BCTs, with their corresponding collective and individual tasks, illustrate the types of operations they are prepared to conduct. Examining the correlation between the enemy threat, GCCs

requirements, and these maneuver BCT's METLs, several operational gaps are identified. Beginning with the enemy threat, irregular warfare is what the Army has identified as the most likely threat in future operational environment. However, the MET of conducting irregular warfare is absent from all three BCTs. COIN, another likely operation, is conducted in a complex environment that requires unity and fusion of multiple forms of combat power. COIN involves the utilization of forces to increase the capacity of all political, economic, military, paramilitary, and civic actions by a government to defeat an insurgency (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, III-5). Other than a few stability tasks, these standardized METLs fail to cover all BCT level operations that are required in a COIN environment. OIF and OEF demonstrated several BCT level tasks, such as conducting security force assistance, interagency integration, political-military integration, and a Special Operations Forces—General Purpose Forces fusion, that are essential for success in a COIN environment (Smith 2009, 4). Additionally, key COIN tasks including restoring essential services, supporting governance, and supporting economic and infrastructure development, are not addressed in these METLs (Department of the Army 2009, 3-1). Other newly emerging threats outlined in the DoD's 2012 White Paper *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*, such as cyber warfare, are not addressed in these standardized METLs. Major General Joseph Anderson, commander of the Army's 4th Infantry Division, identified this specific operational gap when his unit conducted a decisive action rotation at the National Training Center. He recently noted the enemy's hybrid threat model contains the capability to conduct cyber attacks, as well as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

reconnaissance. The BCT is not equipped or trained to deal with this new emerging threat of counter cyber warfare and electronic surveillance (Anderson 2012).

Next, comparing each of the GCC operational needs to these standardized METLs shows an even greater requirement gap. Each GCC identified a need for interoperability with other elements of national power. They also require Army forces to partner with, develop, and train host nation forces, as well as to rapidly respond to natural disasters and humanitarian assistance missions. Although Coordinate Disaster Management is listed on the standardized METLs, it is only placed as an additional MET for National Guard units. The other identified requirements are not addressed in these three BCT METLs. Looking specifically at CENTCOM, their primary concern is U.S. ability to rapidly commit combat forces to engage in irregular warfare, or conduct precision strikes to prevent the proliferation of WMD. As previously indicated, the METL of irregular warfare, and therefore its specific training, is absent from these BCTs. AFRICOM and PACOM both view partnering with host nation military forces as the primary means toward the ends of defeating VEO, or preventing future conflicts. Since no two military forces are alike, partnering with host nation military requires specific training based on the specific nation or state's military. EUCOM desires land forces trained in joint doctrine and NATO type missions, while NORTHCOM requires the training of missile defense forces and disaster relief operations. SOUTHCOM requires land forces that comprehend the complexity of T.O.C, so they can deter their operations while protecting U.S. interests in South America. None of these specific GCC requests are addressed in the METL or supporting tasks.

As previously stated, the maneuver BCT is the primary unit in the modular force system. Currently there are 43 active component BCTs (15 x ABCTs, 8 x SBCT, 20 x IBCTs). Augmenting these BCTs, as well as the Army as a whole, are several Support Brigades and Functional Brigades. Support Brigades include Aviation, Fires, Battlefield Surveillance, Maneuver Enhancement, and Sustainment. These Brigades provide additional combat power, or combat support, to facilitate the maneuver BCT's ability to accomplish their mission. Functional Brigades include Engineer, CA, Military Police (MP), Signal, and Medical brigades. These brigades provide additional capabilities needed in large scale operations and therefore typically operate under theater Army control to support the overall theater level command. Support and Functional Brigades have their own distinct METLs. CA units and MP units are often relied upon as the formation that can fill several of these identified gaps. CA is viewed as the unit that can provide expertise on other elements of national and civilian capabilities, and cultural understanding of a specific area. MP units are often tasked with supporting military-to-military partnership and training. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account these units' specific METLs to see if their mission sets and capabilities fill the identified gaps.

CA units act as a liaison between the civilian populace of a war zone or disaster area and the military presence. CA informs the ground owning commander of the status of the civilian situation, and effects of providing assistance to locals, by either coordinating military operations with NGOs and IGOs, or distributing direct aid and supplies. CA also provides the commander with cultural expertise, refugee operations, assistance with assessing the needs of the civilian populace, and keeps the commander informed of protected targets such as schools, churches, and hospitals. In a complex

operating environment, the Civil Affairs Team (CAT), interfaces with local and international NGOs and private volunteer organizations, to provide the commander with a unique battlefield overlay of all civilian activity, ongoing infrastructure projects, and the presence and mission of NGOs in their assigned area of operation.

The majority of CA units reside within the reserve component of the Army. The active component of CA is comprised of only two brigades, the 95th CA Brigade (BDE) (Airborne) and the 85th CA BDE. The 95th CA BDE (Airborne) is under the command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and has five battalions, the 91st, 92nd, 96th, 97th, and 98th. Each of these battalions is regionally aligned to a GCC, much like Special Forces Groups. The 91st with AFRICOM, the 92nd with EUCOM, the 96th is aligned with CENTCOM, the 97th with PACOM, the 98th with SOUTHCOM (Department of the Army 2013b). These battalions only support U.S. Army Special Operations Command operations.

The 85th CA BDE is under the command of the U.S. Army Forces Command. Its mission is to train, equip, and deploy CATs worldwide in any environment, to conduct operations to mitigate civil vulnerabilities in order to advance U.S. goals, in support of GCC and U.S. ambassadors. The 85th CA BDE supports conventional U.S. forces through its five battalions, the 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, and 84th. The 85th and its subordinate battalions operate within three core competencies; support to U.S. Army Forces Command by deploying CA teams in support of overseas contingency operations; provide persistent CA engagement capability to the GCC, Army Service Component Commanders, and U.S. ambassadors in support of theater engagement plans; deploy CATs, command and control elements, and civil military planning elements to corps and

JTFs in support of humanitarian disaster relief operations and other contingencies as the nation requires (85th Civil Affairs Brigade 2013).

To conduct these three core competences, the 85th CA Brigade trains on the following METs:

1. Conduct Civil Affairs Operations—to include Support Nation Assistance Operations, Coordinate Support to Civil Administration, and Support Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations.
2. Conduct Civil-Military Operations Center Operations
3. Plan Civil Affairs Operations and Civil-Military Operations (Army Training Network 2013).

The METs of the CA BDEs appear to address several of the gaps earlier identified. One important gap is the requirement for land forces to become interdependent on other elements of national power, NGOs and IGOs. CATs provide a link between these elements and the ground forces placed in charge of a particular AOR. CA BDEs also provide assistance with some of the additional complexity of the COIN environment. Particularly, they have the ability to assist ground commanders in determining the status and need of essential services for populations, and provide cultural expertise to land forces. However, the 85th CA BDE is the only active duty CA BDE that supports conventional active duty forces. Based on the number of active duty maneuver BCTs, the 85th is ill-suited to provide direct support to all maneuver forces. Instead, during the course of OEF and OIF, the Army relied heavily on the reserve component to augment deployed BCTs. Furthermore, these CA companies are only assigned to units that have been identified as deploying units. A maneuver battalion receives their CATs only after it



has gone through its training cycle and is in the available phase of the ARFORGEN model. These CATs, depending on the type, generally contain nine to fourteen soldiers. They are prepared to provide CA experience, but rely heavily on the maneuver forces to provide security and manpower to execute CA missions. In other words, though CATs provide additional expertise, maneuver BCTs are still required to perform those identified gaps. Without prior deployment training, BCTs will not be proficient in working with NGOs and IGOs, nor have the cultural awareness required of the GCCs, even with CA augmentation.

Similar to CA units, MP BDEs are utilized to fill several operational gaps. In particular, they have been used to fulfill the need for land forces, to support the training of host nation security forces. A common approach used by many BCTs during OIF and OEF was to utilize their MP units to train the Iraq or Afghan police force, not only in law enforcement, but also in paramilitary operations. As a result, when Headquarters, Department of the Army developed the MP standardized brigade METL, they incorporated the MET of Conduct Host Nation Police Training. Additionally, during OIF and OEF, MPs were used extensively to maintain control over the large numbers of detainees being held by U.S. forces. In the U.S., MPs often provided disaster relief and internal security, while still fulfilling their fundamental function of maintaining discipline and security within the Army. However, there are only six active duty MP BDEs, with many subordinate battalions geographically dispersed and supporting separate divisions. These MP BDEs are generally under direct control of a Theater Sustainment Command or a Corps Headquarters. Their companies are only assigned to support a maneuver BCT once they have been designated as a deploying unit. Prior to receiving deployment orders,

MP BDEs focus their training on developing other police forces and their other METs:

(1) Conduct Law and Order Operations, (2) Conduct Internment (Resettlement)

Operations, (3) Conduct Operational Area Security, and (4) Enhance Movement and

Maneuver. Though MPs are able to assist BCTs in partnering with host nation security

forces, there are simply not enough MP units to handle the military-to-military training

requirements of the GCCs. Additionally, military-to-military training is vastly different

than host nation police force training and development. Therefore, maneuver BCTs must

still be trained and prepared to execute this requirement.

The remaining Support and Functional Brigades, based on their METL, support or add to the capabilities of the maneuver BCTs. Nevertheless, the primary units responsible for defeating the enemy threat and meeting the need of the GCCs are the 43 BCTs.

Therefore, they must be trained to meet all requirements outlined by the threat analysis

and the GCCs. An immediate solution to these operational gaps may be to simply add

these requirements to the maneuver BCT and standardize METLs. However, the current

ARFORGEN model depicts a training period for a BCT as 24 to 36 months. This is the

current window that the BCT trains to become proficient on its METL in order to

transition into a 12 month available stage assigned to support a GCC or remain alert to

support contingency operations. If assigned to support a GCC or a specific mission, the

BCT will be designated as a Deployment Expeditionary Force, in which it may modify its

METL to support that particular operation or mission. This can occur at any point during

the ARFORGEN cycle. If not assigned, the BCT will remain as a Contingency

Expeditionary Force, in which they will train on their standardized approved

Headquarters, Department of the Army METL before transitioning to the Mission Force (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Contingency Expeditionary Force and Deployment Expeditionary Force Model

Source: Department of the Army, Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 14 March 2011), 16.

The paradox facing the BCTs is, while a standardized METL is designed to ensure a unit is proficient in the core competencies of CAM and WAS, the time and resources available to training are not adequate for them to become proficient on all assigned Army Tactical Tasks. This forces BCT commanders to communicate with their respective divisions to determine which METs the BCT will focus on, and which METs will remain untrained. If the BCT is designated as a Deployment Expeditionary Force early in its train or ready period, through mission analysis it can effectively shape its priorities to meet the needs of the mission or operation it is assigned. However, with the

completion of OIF and the anticipated conclusion of OEF in 2014, most units will find themselves designated as a Contingency Expeditionary Force. It becomes problematic for these BCTs to anticipate which METs they should focus on, and which task(s) should be less of a priority. Additionally, this means that, throughout the Army there will be disparity between each of the BCTs in regard to proficiency in core tasks. It is unlikely that each BCT will focus completely on the same METs, Task Groups, collective, and individual tasks. This decreases the desired effect of having standardized METLs for all maneuver BCTs. Furthermore, by attempting to ensure the BCT is effective in both MCO and stability operations, commanders are sacrificing expertise in a particular MET in order to incorporate training in other tasks. This is evident by examining increasing collective training trends during BCT's Combat Training Center rotations.

In his senior leader observation report, Major General Anderson discusses key points he observed during a rotation to National Training Center in which his division conducted Decisive Action Operations against a hybrid threat. Anderson noted the past ten years of war has made the Army extremely proficient in stability operations and, based on the threat environment, it is important for the Army to maintain these skills. However, the hybrid threat model, reintroducing the conventional force on force engagement, has highlighted a lack of proficiency and general knowledge in MCO. Tasks that have previously been mastered by BDE level staffs have since been forgotten or untrained, in order to focus on the essential tasks linked to Afghanistan or Iraq operations. For example, Anderson noted that while conducting offensive operations, the BCT was not properly trained to maneuver the Headquarter element, Tactical Operations Center, or Tactical Command Post to maintain mission command on the battlefield.

Additionally, the staff could not effectively synchronize all fire assets at the decisive point of the operations. The BCT was accustomed to conducting area security to protect the force, but the ability to execute a defense to attrit the enemy force while transitioning to the offense has atrophied at the BCT level. BCTs and division staffs were also untrained in air space management, forcible entry operations, and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in an immature theater of operations (Anderson 2012). The general theme of the reports leads to a conclusion that BCTs are not adequately prepared for force on force combat that occurs in the hybrid threat model.

Other National Training Center reports complement Anderson's views. Colonel Paul Calvert, Commander of the National Training Center Operations Group, illustrates these very same issues in a National Training Center Decisive Action Training Environment Newsletter. Calvert highlights that BCT staffs are challenged with intelligence collection and analysis to support combined arms maneuver. Additionally, the past ten years of COIN focus have degraded the BCT's ability to defeat peer military forces. For example, intelligence staffs were designed and trained to analyze the enemy threat in a COIN environment. However, the ability to comprehend and communicate the enemy's conventional forces strength, disposition, and order of battle is lacking. The proper tracking of the enemy forces during force-on-force engagement has quickly become a lost art. Calvert also noted the importance of BCTs retraining on sustainment operations in an immature theater. The report further discusses how field artillery, and the officer and soldiers within the branch, had a completely different role in the COIN environment. Lethal and non-lethal targeting has become the focus the BCT's fires section during OIF and OEF. The skill of massing fires to achieve a desired effect against

capable military forces has been largely ignored and not properly retrained. Other MCO supporting tasks, such as engineers providing mobility support to offensive maneuver and defensive survivability construction efforts, have become difficult tasks to perform. The BCTs have lost the ability to integrate air defense assets into defensive posture, as well as effectively neutralizing the enemy's air defense systems (Steel 2012, 31-34). This general theme clearly supports the conclusion that BCTs have sacrificed expertise in force-on-force, or peer to peer combat, in order to maintain a level of proficiency in both core competencies of CAM and WAS. In other words, though they may focus more on certain aspects of their standardized METL, BCTs are attempting to maintain some level of proficiency on each assigned MET. This is an unrealistic endeavor given the time constraint and training resources available to a BCT in the current ARFORGEN model. The current fiscal limitation will further hinder the BCT's ability to train on all assigned METs.

#### Regionally Aligned Brigade

A possible way to meet the requirements of the GCC, and concentrate the BCTs training plan to meet the needs of a particular operating environment, is the Army's concept for regionally aligning each brigade. The principal idea of the RAB is for conventional brigades to focus its training on preparation to support an assigned COCOM in a specific operational environment. For example, an RAB assigned to SOUTHCOM would potentially work closely with IGOs in order to focus on deterring or defeating T.O.C.s. The Army has already selected U.S. Army Africa to conduct a pilot RAB rotation in 2013. In essence this BDE begins its training path as a Deployment

Expeditionary Force, allowing the staff to select the METs that best meet the needs of the GCC.

Additionally, several military experts believe the greatest lesson learned from the past decade of conflict during OIF and OEF, is the critical aspect of understanding culture and values. General Odierno, the current Chief of Staff of the Army, states “Nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values” (Odierno 2012). For this reason the Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the innovative idea of aligning brigades to support one of the six GCCs (Department of the Army 2012d, 8). These BDEs would not only tailor their METLs to meet the specific needs of their respective GCC, but also to understanding the culture of the area. On the other hand, unless Army polices and personnel management systems change, RABs will not accomplish this desired end state, nor the needs of the Army.

The idea of RAB is not poorly conceived. Every GCC would prefer to own and control forces that are knowledgeable of the culture they are operating in, particularly when it comes to the initial forces entering the AOR. Initial entry conducted by RABs would reduce the risk of ground forces making cultural mistakes that may adversely have a strategic effect to the operations. Nevertheless there are three reasons why RABs will not achieve Odierno’s intent. First, the current requirements of the BCTs are too vast to support focusing their efforts on becoming experts in a particular region. Second, current manning polices hinder their ability to maintain this expertise. Third, efforts in creating expertise within these RABs are lost if the Army maintains its current model of modularity.

To succeed in an uncertain future, the U.S. Army has identified the requirement for BCTs to be proficient in both core competencies of CAM and WAS in order to achieve victory in any operational environment. BCTs are expected to be capable of war fighting in high-intensity MCO, as well as, conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations. This vast requirement is the first problem confronting RABs. Today's BCTs are required to leverage decisive combat power against an enemy to seize the initiative while degrading the enemy's ability to mount a coherent response (Romjue 2011, 24). Properly training BCTs to perform in MCO requires a tremendous amount of time, money, and effort. Today, these same forces now have stability METs added to their standardize METLs. Meaning today's BCTs must be able to partner with indigenous security forces, secure populations, develop or strengthen governance, and other stabilization or reconstruction operations (Miers 2011, 18-20, 30, 42).

To prepare to conduct all these types of operations is a daunting task. Assigning the same BCTs to a specific area with the additional requirement of developing an inherent cultural understanding within the unit does not focus their training efforts, but rather adds to it. For example, a BCT assigned to CENTCOM could focus on conducting irregular warfare tactics and the cultural aspect of those regions. What if a conventional conflict then erupts in PACOM's AOR? The Army may require that same BCT to be deployed in order to conduct MCO for PACOM. In which case, the BCT would be unprepared to conduct MCO in a general war environment. This is why General Odierno stated that BCTs, even as RABs, must foremost focus on the core competencies of CAM and WAS, before training on their regional task(s). Figure 6 is a draft timeline of a RAB's ARFORGEN cycle.






Figure 6. Draft ARFORGEN Cycle for RABs

*Source:* Regionally Aligned Forces, <https://fcportal.forscom.army.mil/sites/raep/raf/SitePages/RAFHome.aspx> (accessed 15 March 2013).

Cultural training is not simple. A complete understanding of a culture requires a tremendous amount of research, study, and time (Solmoni and Holmes-Eber 2009, 13). Most cultures have certain nuances that can only be understood after imbedding oneself within the society for an extended period of time. In particular, it is difficult and time consuming to obtain the level of language proficiency required for effectiveness in combat operations. Unit leaders will have to provide the time and training needed to achieve a level of proficiency that will be useful. Language training also requires allocating funds to contract qualified instructors. Thus, BCTs will have to prioritize training resources, time, and money between preparing for MCO, stability operations, and cultural understanding. The core competencies of CAM and WAS now include Regional Task(s).

The second problem with RABs deals with manning the force. Under the current ARFORGEN cycle construct, once a BCT returns from a deployment the majority of the senior Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers move on to other assignment(s). This includes attending military education courses or due to promotion, moving to fill an open position for the appropriate rank. Other junior soldiers who have fulfilled their obligation

may choose not to re-enlist. The loss of experience and new leaders filling the ranks, forces the BCT to retrain on its basic essential tasks. Even as deployments become less frequent and the Army attempts to stabilize soldiers at one location for a longer period of time, promotions, career progression, and individual needs will continually change the manning within a BCT (Griffin 2012, 2).

Manning issues of this sort are nothing new to BCT Commanders. This constant rotation of soldiers always made it difficult to maintain a level of proficiency on essential tasks. It is advantageous that most collective and individual training tasks between maneuver BCTs are universally similar. Today their METLs are all standardized. Therefore, as a BCT may lose experience from reassigning a soldier, they may gain from the knowledge of their replacement. This will not hold true with RABs. As previously mentioned cultural training, in particular maintaining language proficiency is complex and time consuming. More importantly, these skills are extremely focused for a specific area and are not universally transferred. Training of this kind makes very little sense when soldiers will move to a new unit, possibly aligned to a different region. In an attempt to maintain their cultural requirement, RABs would most likely prefer to retain a soldier who has demonstrated great proficiency in these perishable skills. However, this could adversely impact the soldier's opportunity for promotion over the course of a normal career (Griffin 2012, 2).

The final and probably most important issue with RAB is its contrast with the Army's modularity model. The change to modularity has transformed the Army from a division-based structure optimized for large-scale conventional wars to a brigade-based expeditionary force. The intent was to create an Army that could tailor its organization

into task forces with the capabilities required for a specific mission. This also facilitates the ARFORGEN cycle by synchronizing the building of trained and ready units (F106 2012, RA-8). The key to modularity is the ability to send a BCT anywhere in the world to conduct MCO or stability operations. Focusing a BCT to a region does not support this model. Training resources, expenses, and time are wasted when a regionally aligned BCT is deployed to a completely different region. It is a likely possibility that once OEF has culminated, all BCTs will eventually return to a state of high readiness. However, if conflict should arise, only those BCTs aligned to that part of the world would be prepared to handle the operation. However, major conflict, whether CAM or WAS, is a long-term endeavor. It will require BCTs to rotate in and out of theater. Additional, future budget constraints will most likely limit the amount of BCTs that will be at a state of high readiness. Instead, the Army budget will likely follow an ARFORGEN model in which the majority of funds are allocated to units designated in the training cycle. This will create a tier level of readiness throughout the Army.

Regionally aligning forces would be a good approach for addressing some of the challenges of an uncertain future. The past decade of war has shown those soldiers possessing cultural and linguistic abilities are immense combat multipliers. Aligning units with a region and allowing cross training would improve planning and operations with host nation partners. However, the Army still requires BCTs to be capable of conducting combat and stability operations worldwide. The training needed to produce these BCTs prevents them from adequately focusing on a specific region. The rotation of soldiers, along with the complexity of cultural training, hinders the BCT's ability to become proficient in their region. Under modularity, BCTs can and should be expected to

deploy worldwide. Because of this, efforts to become proficient in the culture of a region will become a lesser priority, as BCTs struggle with becoming proficient on all their assigned METs.

### The CAM-F and S&S-F Two-Force Concept

The data presented in this chapter illustrates the vast number of tasks Army forces must conduct in order to meet the needs of the GCCs, as well as decisively defeat a myriad of enemy threats operating along a wide spectrum of conflict. The Department of the Army's standardized METLs identified those essential tasks required to adequately perform the Army's core competencies of CAM and WAS. This concept is based on a single force model in which all BCTs simultaneously perform offensive, defensive, and stability operations. However, this research identified several operational gaps within the BCT METLs. For example, irregular warfare operations, military-to-military partnership, and coordination with IGOs and NGOs are absent from the BCT's METL. Additionally, these standardized METLs do not address specific threats identified by the GCCs, such as T.O.C. in SOUTHCOM. Furthermore, Combat Training Centers, particularly during Decisive Action rotations, have noted that BCTs are having difficulty conducting major combat and stability operations simultaneously. Due to the past decade of focusing on stability operations, knowledge and proficiency in MCO tasks, such as the development of an engagement area or integration of effective fires, are absent at the BCT level (Anderson 2012, 12). These critical skills are not being developed as BCT Commanders are forced to broaden their training across the entire spectrum of Unified Land Operations.

An alternative to this single force model is a dual force concept. In this concept, one segment of the Army is dedicated to the proficiency of decisively defeating conventional and irregular forces. BCTs associated with the CAM-F would focus exclusively on METs associated with offensive, defensive, and security operations. BCT Commanders would then focus their unit's training on the effective application of lethal force in order to gain and maintain enemy contact, disrupt the enemy, fix the enemy, maneuver, and follow through to their defeat, as outlined in FM 3-90, *Offense and Defense*. Critical war fighting skills that atrophied during the past decade of conflict, such as the lethal integration of fires, complex forms of maneuver, and sustainment practices in an undeveloped theater of operations, become the primary key competencies of this force. Furthermore, in support of modularity, these BCTs are able to apply elements of lethal combat power anywhere on the spectrum of conflict, in any theater of operation.

In 2003, Dr. Hans Binnendijk and Dr. Stuart Johnson presented a detailed study to the House Armed Service Committee on why the U.S. military was unprepared to handle the unstable environment that existed after the initial invasion of OIF and OEF. Their research led to two fundamental conclusions. One, units committed to stability and reconstruction operations should not participate in, or directly support, combat operations. Two, a stabilization force should be developed for the sole purpose of addressing the complexity of stability and reconstruction operations (Binnendijk and Johnson 2005, 6). During the past decade of war, the Army has adapted to become proficient in stability operations. However, in order for the Army to maintain the lessons learned from OIF and OEF and improve their effectiveness, the second segment of the force would be responsible for stability operations. The S&S-F would focus exclusively

on METs that are associated with stability operations, to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. This effectively alleviates stability training requirements from the BCTs associated with the CAM-F. Units within the S&S-F would be proficient in performing stability operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict. For example, these forces would be able to conduct natural or man-made disaster relief operations during a limited intervention campaign. During irregular warfare or COIN, these forces would provide the expertise needed to facilitate the legitimacy of the host nation government, the development of essential services, and the synchronization of IGO and NGO efforts. During MCO, the S&S-F would assist with setting the conditions for post-conflict activities, such as reconciliation and nation building (Department of the Army 2008b, 4-8). Stability operations vastly differ from one region of the world to another. For example, proficiency in African governance, military capabilities, and social structure may not be adequate to facilitate stability operations in Afghanistan. Therefore the S&S-F would be regionally aligned with GCCs in order to tailor their education, training, and expertise to effectively conduct stability operations. This force would provide the cultural experts desired by the GCCs. Furthermore, by regionally aligning this force, each unit would become proficient in working with other elements of national power, IGOs, and NGOs that are operating within the region. The S&S-F would therefore become interdependent on other elements of national power in order to facilitate a whole-of-government approach within their assigned region. Additionally, this force would focus on developing and implementing a strategy to meet the threats and challenges uniquely identified by each of the GCCs.

The fundamental theory of the dual force concept is that, through focused training and resourcing, the CAM-F and the S&S-F would gain a higher level of ability than the single force model. Holistically, the Army would achieve a greater level of proficiency and expertise while remaining true to its dual core competencies, CAM and WAS. To achieve this, both the CAM-F and the S&S-F must be able to complement each other by augmentation or direct support. In general, according to Joint Publication 5-0, *Operations*, military operations contains five phases: Phase I (Deter), Phase II (Seizing the Initiative), Phase III (Dominating), Phase IV (Stabilize), and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). Throughout these phases, a mixture of both the CAM-F and S&S-F would be utilized to augment or support each other, while targeting specific objects within the operational or campaign strategy.

Prior to Phase I, and at the completion of Phase V, the GCCs are responsible for shaping their AOR. This is known as Phase 0—Shaping. During Phase 0, the S&S-F would be employed as the Army's main effort to support the GCCs and their strategy. If the environment becomes more volatile, moving further along the spectrum of conflict, CAM-F may be deployed to provide additional security. For example, a natural disaster such as a hurricane may create an unstable peace environment. The S&S-F would provide the expertise needed to conduct disaster relief operations, however, the COCOM may require additional CAM-F in order to provide force protection and security. During an insurgency, Phase I (Deter), may require units associated with the S&S-F to provide expertise in governance and culture in order to deter the escalation of the conflict. This endeavor would continue during Phase II (Seizing the Initiative), as BCTs within the CAM-F are deployed to seize the initiative against the insurgency. Eventually, enough

combat power would be utilized to execute Phase III (Dominate). In this phase, the CAM-F may be the COCOM's main effort against the insurgent forces. The S&S-F, in a supporting role, would focus on setting the conditions for Phase IV (Stabilize). As the security conditions are set to an acceptable level of violence, stability operations would become the priority. As such, S&S-F would become the main effort in order to achieve stability objectives and transition authority back to the host nation. During this phase, the CAM-F would support the S&S-F by providing local security, continuing operations against the insurgency, and facilitating the training of host nation forces. This illustrates the idea that, while both the CAM-F and S&S-F focus on a specific aspect of Unified Land Operations, the Army can integrate units from each force in order to meet the challenges of the specific operation.

#### Advantages of the Dual Force Concept

The tenets of Unified Land Operations describe the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-12). These tenets are: flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. The Army strives to develop flexible plans, leaders, and organizations in order to overcome adversity. Flexibility enables commanders to rapidly adapt to changing circumstances during an operation. Greater flexibility facilitates the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment, based on the needs of the environment. Integration is the utilization of the capabilities and resources of the joint force, IGOs, NGOs, and other elements of national power towards a common objective. Integration requires an in depth understanding of U.S government capabilities and interagency coordination, in order to implement a whole-of-government approach to address the



challenges of an operation. Lethality is the ability to employ lethal force in order to decisively defeat an adversary. Lethality is the fundamental attribute of any military organization, and is essential for success in decisive action. There exists a complementary relationship between the use of lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. Adaptability is the application of critical thinking, effectively operating in ambiguity, reacting to unforeseen events, and rapidly adjusting to meet the needs of the current operating environment. Depth is the extension of an operation to affect the entire operational framework in time and space. The operational framework is made up of the close and deep fight, as well as the security dimension of an operation. Synchronization is the employment of a complementary military action in time and space for the purpose of maximizing combat power at the decisive point of an operation. Operating in depth and with synchronization of efforts is critical in addressing the multitude of challenges typically found on the modern battlefield (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-12).

When considering the tenets of Unified Land Operation as a base of comparison, a clear advantage of the dual force concept emerges. Under the single force model, flexibility and adaptability is achieved two ways. First, through modularity, the Army achieves flexibility by deploying BCTs, functional brigades, and support brigades as part of a JTF. The JTF is tailored to meet the needs of the GCC and the operational environment. Second, leaders are charged with developing units that can quickly understand emerging situations, capitalize on key points of opportunity, and employ combat power where it can best shape the environment. The dual force concept provides flexibility in the same ways. However, the GCC of the dual force concept have greater

flexibility in shaping the JTF. They do this by selecting forces focus proficient in either MCO or stability operations. For example, in order to conduct a humanitarian assistance (HA) mission, the GCC may create a JTF that is commanded by, and mainly composed of, units from the S&S-F. During MCO, the JTF may encompass more BCTs from the CAM-F to defeat an opposing force, but contain some units from the S&S-F to facilitate transitioning to stability operations. Therefore, the dual force concept provides greater flexibility when establishing JTFs, by providing the focused expertise needed by the GCCs.

The dual force concept has advantages over the single force model for developing flexible and adaptive units. Flexible and adaptable units must have a complete comprehension of the operating environment, and fully understand their own capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. By focusing units on either combat or stability operations, leaders can better understand their capabilities and limitations within that environment. This creates subordinates that are able to identify key opportunities within their expertise, as well as fully understand how to adapt their combat power to achieve a desired effect. For example, leaders within the CAM-F that are proficient in defensive operations will be able to recognize opportunities that the terrain may provide in order to successfully delay an enemy's attack. Units within the S&S-F would become flexible and adaptive when working with IGOs and NGOs in order to leverage their capabilities without exceeding their mandates. By creating units that fully understand their capabilities and limitations, the dual force concept would be inherently better at adaptation in order to capitalize on their strengths while mitigating their weaknesses.

Under the single force model, BCTs are having difficulties decisively defeating near-peer enemies that are presented at Combat Training Centers. Additionally, GCCs have identified the need for land forces to become interdependent on other elements of national and host nation powers. Interoperability is currently not addressed in BCTs' METL. The dual force model provides a way to not only increase the lethality of the force, but also the ability to integrate other elements of the joint force and national powers. By alleviating METs associated with stability operations, BCTs within the CAM-F can focus their training and resources on offensive and defensive tasks. This creates BCTs that are more proficient in the application of lethal force. Additionally, in order to increase their lethality, BCT within the CAM-F will become proficient at integrating other lethal elements of the joint forces into their training plan. For example, during a defensive operation, a BCT could incorporate the Air Force into their integrated fires plan. The focused training of the CAM-F will increase the overall lethality of the Army. In the same way, the focus on stability operations will increase the non-lethal proficiency of the S&S-F. Critical to the success of the regionally aligned S&S-F is their ability to work with other elements of national and host nation powers, and integrate the capabilities brought by NGOs working in their AOR. For example, during a disaster relief operation, the S&S-F will provide a command and control network in addition to expertise in planning complex operations. However, this force will rely upon other organizations, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Red Cross to provide the materials and finances needed to support the operations. The S&S-F, by its nature, must be able and effective in integrating other organizations into a complex operation.

Currently, the single force model provides the entire Army an overall understanding of both CAM and WAS. Since Department of the Army requires the entire force to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations, a common understanding is established among all units. This increases the depth of knowledge units are expected to have, as well as their understanding of how MCO are linked with stability operations. However, the dual force concept creates a greater level of proficiency within the CAM-F and the S&S-F, which increases understanding of the operational framework. The CAM-F will have a greater level of proficiency in integrating and synchronizing lethal force to affect the close and deep fight. The dual force model will also provide the expertise needed to effectively provide security for the S&S-F and other enablers. In the same way, the expertise in the S&S-F would produce a greater level of operational depth and synchronization during stability operations. It is therefore the responsibility of the Joint Force Commander to synchronize the efforts of units from the CAM-F and the S&S-F. This is a difficult task to properly execute during a major campaign or operation. Thus the dual force concept has the potential to synchronize efforts that address the needs of the operations to a great level of depth and proficiency, as compared to the single force model.

The analysis of the dual force concept, as viewed through the tenets of Unified Land Operations, demonstrates an advantage over the single force model. Key lessons learned from case studies conducted on the 2005 to 2006 Lebanon War further strengthen this conclusion. As discussed in chapter 1, prior to 2006, the IDF believed its future was fighting Palestinian terrorists. Therefore, funding for combined arms training, particularly in the heavy armored units, became extremely limited. For 16 years, counterterrorism

operations in the West Bank and Gaza were the primary focus of the IDF. These operations were highly centralized with active involvement of Israeli high level leadership. Over the years, this had a stifling effect on small unit initiative. The IDF also relied on its Air Force, as well as its reputation from past victories to deter its enemies from conducting MCO against Israel. Instead, Israel faced an enemy that had adapted their tactics in order to capitalize on their strengths while attacking the IDF's weaknesses. Upon entering into Lebanon, the IDF faced the non-state legitimate army of Hezbollah's military wing, the IR. This force utilized a combination of conventional and irregular warfare tactics to defeat the IDF. The IDF, which had focused exclusively on COIN and counterterrorism, lost the ability to conduct MCO (Zagdanski 2007, 32-35).

This was not a simple mistake of focusing on the wrong type of warfare. There was, and still remains, a legitimate terrorist threat in Israel. Additionally, due to the volatile relationship between Israel and Palestine, the IDF must retain their ability to conduct stability operations in order to deter any events that could lead to greater instability. For example, terrorist organizations attacking Israeli settlements from within the Gaza Strip have a great potential of destabilizing the region. The IDF must be able to conduct COIN and stability operations (such as border patrols) in order to maintain security within the region. And yet, as the 2005 to 2006 Lebanon War demonstrated, the IDF must also sustain its ability to conduct MCO against a hybrid enemy threat. The dual force concept is a way the IDF could maintain an ability to defeat a well prepared and equipped hybrid threat, as well as conduct COIN and stability operations. Unlike the U.S. model presented in this research, the IDF would most likely shape one force to focus on MCO against a hybrid threat, with the other on COIN / stability operations. However, the

advantages of the dual force concept are still valid. By dedicating a portion of the force to those tasks associated with MCO, the IDF will retain an essential component of war fighting. This concept allows the second half of the force to train on and retain those skills that have proven useful against terrorists within the region. Additionally, the dual force concept, through focused training and resourcing, would produce a higher level of proficiency within a specific field, facilitating the IDF's ability to adapt to a complex and unpredictable environment.

### Summary

This chapter utilized a three step approach to determine if the development of a separate CAM-F and S&S-F would enhance the Army's ability to meet the challenges of future operations. The first step was identifying potential enemy threats that the Army of 2020 will face. Additional to the enemy threats, this research identified Army capabilities required by the GCCs to adequately meet their operational needs. This analysis generated a list of operations, tasks, and capabilities that the Army is required to perform. The second step compared the newly generated list of operations, tasks, and capabilities to the current force at the BCT level. This was accomplished by examining BCT METLs to identify the task, units are actually prepared for. Tasks and capabilities identified in step one that were not addressed in the analyses conducted on the BCTs, were labeled as operational or requirement gaps. Following this analysis, step three examined eliminating or reducing these gaps by introducing the concept of the dual force by establishing a CAM-F and S&S-F. A common criteria list based on the tenets of Unified Land Operations was established to compare the CAM-F and S&S-F against the current single force model and their abilities to meet these requirements.

The analysis conducted concludes that the development of a CAM-F and S&S-F will greatly enhance the Army's ability to support the GCCs and prepare for future conflicts. The final chapter will illustrate how this conclusion was reached as well as provide recommendations for future research.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Summary of Research

Military revolutions are the purposeful creations of people. They are created by a combination of technological breakthrough, institutional adaptation, and warfighting innovation. They are not emergent properties that result accidentally or unconsciously from a cumulative process of technological invention.

— Michael O’Hanlon, 2000

The contemporary operational environment requires the Army to be proficient in two specific core competencies—CAM and WAS. However, military experts debate whether or not it is feasible for a single force to adequately be trained and equipped to accomplish all tasks associated with these two competencies. Therefore, this research focused on the question of whether or not the Army needs to develop a separate CAM-F and S&S-F in order to meet the challenges of future operations. To answer this question, an analysis was conducted on future enemy threats and their operational environments. This analysis indicates that irregular warfare is the most likely operational environment land forces will face in the future. However, the most dangerous threat remains a belligerent conventional military force that possesses WMD. Therefore, the Army must be able to conduct operations within a spectrum of conflict, from limited peace intervention, to insurgency, to general war. Additionally, further analysis of the GCCs’ requirements was conducted in order to understand the operational environment. This generated a list of operations, tasks, and capabilities required of the Army. The list included common tasks such as partnership with foreign armies, facilitating a whole-of-government approach, and specific regional tasks such as countering T.O.C. and drug



trafficking, and supporting NATO operations. Comparing the list against current BCT METLs identified operational and requirement gaps, such as a lack of focus on irregular warfare and lack of ability to work with IGOs and NGOs. The data presented also indicated an inability for BCTs to adequately perform MCO and stability operations simultaneously. To address these operational and requirement gaps, the dual-force concept of a CAM-F and S&S-F was introduced as an alternative to the single force model. This research then compared the notion of a CAM-F and S&S-F against the current forces structure, by establishing a common criteria list based on the tenets of Unified Land Operations. This comparison illustrates the dual-force concept increases the flexibility, lethality, and warfighting expertise of the Army. Based on the analysis conducted, this research concludes the development of a CAM-F and S&S-F greatly enhances the Army's ability to support the GCCs and prepare for future conflicts.

#### Recommendations for Future Research

Though this research supports the development of the CAM-F and S&S-F, further research is required in order to bring this conclusion (recommendation) into practice. The current BCT organization is the ideal component to make up the CAM-F. The BCT is designed to integrate the actions of maneuver battalions, field artillery, aviation, engineers, intelligence, and collection assets. Their core mission is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture enemy forces or repel enemy attacks (Department of the Army 2010a, 13). This research highlighted the concern that BCT's ability to defeat peer military forces has diminished. However, refocusing exclusively on MCO will increase their ability to conduct high-intensity combat operations. Further research is recommended in order to ensure the BCT, with adequate

training and its sole focus on MCO, is properly structured and resourced to optimize its performance.

Stability operations require a comprehensive understanding of the environment. Local governance, economic structure, and cultural awareness are examples of some of the critical aspects that land forces must understand in order to support the efforts of GCCs. Over the past decade of war, the Army has adapted into a force capable of stability and reconstruction operations. In order to maintain and further develop this skill, while ensuring our ability to conduct MCO, this research paper recommends the development of an S&S-F. The S&S-F must be a component of the Army that provides direct support to GCCs in order to assist them with shaping their AOR and Phase 0 activities. This force must provide expertise in stability operations, interagency coordination, and the utilization of IGOs and NGOs operating within GCCs AORs. Currently, the Army lacks formations that are organized to conduct this mission. An initial option may be to increase the number of CA units. However, as illustrated in chapter 4, CA forces act as an augmentation to the BCTs and rely heavily on their support in order to conduct operations. Furthermore, the CA mission of providing commanders a liaison to civil authorities, though important, is only a part of stability operations. CA units are not designed to address all tasks and missions inherent in stability operations. Therefore, further research is needed to develop the specific design, organization, and structure of the S&S-F. This includes the design of individual units, creation of stability branches, or Military Occupation Specialties within the S&S-F.

As stated in chapter 3, it is not within the scope of this research to examine economic resourcing, facilities, and equipment requirements. The Joint Capabilities

Integration Development System is the procedure in which the DoD defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs, including force structure changes. When proposing a solution, the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process considers its implications on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF). The change from a single force model to the dual-force concept would have second and third order effects on DOTMLPF. Therefore, in order to test the feasibility of reorganizing the Army into a CAM-F and S&S-F, further analyses based on DOTMLPF are necessary. Additionally, while determining the feasibility of redesigning the Army into the dual-force concept, the fiscal reality of the declining DoD budget cannot be ignored. Further research into the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, DOTMLPF, and economic considerations is necessary before the dual-force concept can be implemented.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, this research has suggested that the concept of developing a CAM-F and S&S-F is sound and will greatly enhance the Army's ability to meet the needs of the GCCs in the contemporary operational environment, as well as future conflicts. Additionally, the dual-force concept, particularly with regionally aligning the S&S-F, will provide responsive tailored forces to the GCCs. However, the feasibility of fundamentally transforming the Army from a single force model into the dual-force concept can only be determined after further research is conducted in three key areas: BCT origination as part of the CAM-F, the specific design and structure of the S&S-F, and the effects on DOTMLPF and DoD budgets.

But here's my bottom line: we should have let the Leviathan force go in and do its business in Iraq just like it did, but instead of hoping it all worked out in its aftermath we should have sent in right behind them the mass troops of the SysAdmin force, complete with lots of allied forces, and then we would not be in the mess we are in today . . . we need a force to wage war and another to wage peace. (Barnett 2004b)

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